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The GATT Agriculture Dispute: A European
Perspective
Henricus A. Stratingt
Editor's Note: This Article was completed in November, 1992. Since then, a
tentative agricultural agreement has been reached between the United States
and the European Economic Community. This "agreement" can only be called
tentative because France threatens to block any accord that negatively impacts
its farming industry. The author addresses this development in the epilogue to
this Article.
Insofar as agriculture is concerned, all nations live in glasshouses and none,
therefore, can throw stones. 1
Introduction
In 1986, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT
or "the Agreement") launched the Uruguay Round, its most ambi-
tious series of Multilateral Trade Negotiations. Among the fifteen
different negotiating groups, the agricultural trade group was con-
sidered not only the most important, but also the most contentious.
It was considered the most important because a number of partici-
pating countries pointed out that failure to reach an agreement on
agriculture would block an agreement in any of the other fourteen
fields; it was considered the most contentious because domestic agri-
cultural policies remained virtually unchallenged during the forty-
five years of GATT, causing serious international trade distortions.
Although one hundred eight countries are currently participating in
the Uruguay Round, the lack of agreement on agriculture between
two participants, the United States (U.S.) and the European Commu-
nity (EC or Community), is the focus of attention and has stalled the
Round since December 1990, threatening the very existence of the
GAIT as a trade organization.
Much is at stake: collapse of the Uruguay Round may lead to a
loss of $1 trillion in increased economic output for both the United
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University of Arkansas School of Law (1992). I thank J.W. Looney, P.J. Teunissen, Eric
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T Palmeter, Agriculture and Trade Regulation: Selected Issues in the Application of U.S. An-
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States and the EC.I The developing countries will also be substantial
losers. Because they rely more than anyone else on agricultural ex-
ports, agricultural trade liberalization will benefit developing nations
most. 2 Moreover, these negative effects of the failure to achieve
agreement may be intensified by increased protectionism and re-
gional trade bloc formation on a global scale, creating more trade
barriers and trade distortions. In short, no one will gain by a GATT
failure.
Nevertheless, the Uruguay Round is close to collapse. Because
the disagreement on agricultural trade liberalization is most acute
between the United States and the EC, a relevant and obvious ques-
tion is which of the two is to blame. U.S. politicians and negotiators
mainly argue that the EC is solely responsible for the fact that a com-
promise on agriculture has not yet been reached.3 Although the
Community indeed has been reluctant to modify its controversial
Common Agricultural Policy (CAP), this passing of the blame to the
EC not only over-simplifies the complexities of agricultural trade ne-
gotiations, but also overlooks the history and origin of the GATT,
the EC and its CAP, as well as the Uruguay Round itself. In each of
these entities, the U.S. historically played an essential role, and
helped lay the foundation for the present situation by imposing a
number of important constraints on the negotiating process in the
Uruguay Round with regard to agriculture. Additionally, in May
1992, the EC adopted a far-reaching overhaul plan that substantially
reforms the CAP.
This article identifies and analyzes the main constraints on agri-
cultural trade liberalization in the current GATT Uruguay Round
I Estimation of U.S. Trade Representative Carla Hills. See Uruguay Round of Multilat-
eral Talks Tops U.S. Trade Agenda for 1991 as Administration, Congress Also Prepare to Deal with
Range of Other Issues, 8 INT'L TRADE REP. (BNA) 62 (Jan. 9, 1991) (loss to occur over ten
years).
2 The overall net effect of agricultural trade liberalization for the developing coun-
tries is expected to be positive. Consumers in Third World countries, however, will be
worse off as a result of higher commodity prices, as will be the net food importing develop-
ing countries. See, e.g., IAN GOLDIN & ODIN KNUDSEN (eds.), AGRICULTURAL TRADE LIBERAL-
IZATION: IMPLICATIONS FOR DEVELOPING COUNTRIES (1990); B. KRISSOFF, J. SULLIVAN, J.
WAINIO & B. JOHNSON, AGRICULTURAL TRADE LIBERALIZATION AND DEVELOPING COUNTRIES
(U.S. Dep't of Agric., 1990).
3 For example, Clayton Yeutter, Counselor to the President, former U.S. Trade Rep-
resentative, and U.S. Secretary of Agriculture during the crucial Ministerial meeting in
Brussels (December 1990) puts the responsibility for the failing Uruguay Round exclu-
sively on the EC. USDA Preparing $1 Billion Increase in Export Subsidies if GA TT Talks Fail, 9
INT'L TRADE REP. (BNA) 572 (Apr. 1, 1992). In addition, the United States Senate signed a
letter to President Bush saying: "The refusal of the EC to make meaningful commitments
in those (GATT) negotiations has been the primary stumbling block to progress in the
Uruguay Round." Scheid, Senators Urge Retaliation Against EC Oilseed Policy, FEEDSTUFFS,
Apr. 29, 1991, at 4. For an overview of corresponding opinions of the U.S. executive and
the American commodity organizations, see Review of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade
Negotiations under the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade: Hearing before the Subcomm. on De-
partment Operations, Research, and Foreign Agriculture of the House Comm. on Agriculture, I 02d
Cong., 1st Sess. (1991).
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from a strictly European perspective. However, today can never be
fully understood without an understanding of yesterday. Therefore,
the identification and analysis of the constraints needs to be placed
in the context of a historical foundation. Accordingly, Part 1 gives an
overview of the origin and development of the GATT and the posi-
tion of agriculture within the Agreement. The next two parts will
shift the focus to the EC. Part 2 introduces the EC and addresses the
Community's position in the GATT. After a brief description of the
origin and development of the CAP, Part 3 provides a fairly detailed
description of the EC's agricultural policy, using the grain market as
an example. The recent agricultural reform package adopted by the
Community will be introduced in this section. This part concludes
with a number of important notions necessary to fully understand
the CAP. Part 4 addresses the developments on agriculture in the
Uruguay Round so far. Part 5 identifies and analyzes the constraints
that have prevented an agreement on agriculture in the GATT Uru-
guay Round. Finally, Part 6 identifies a number of current and fu-
ture developments in Europe and contains a proposal to break the
current stalemate in the Uruguay Round.
I. The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
A. Background and History
An international trade organization was planned originally to be
part of the preparatory negotiations to design a new postwar interna-
tional economic system. At the Bretton Woods conference in 1944,
devoted to monetary and banking issues, the representatives of forty-
four nations established the charters of the International Monetary
Fund (IMF) and the International Bank for Reconstruction and De-
velopment (IBRD, commonly known as the World Bank). However,
the conference failed to take up the problems of trade, although it
recognized the need for a comparable institution for trade to com-
plement the other institutions. 4
In 1945 the United Nations (U.N.) was formed. The Economic
and Social Council (ECOSOC), a United Nations subordinate body,
adopted a resolution at its initial meeting calling for a conference to
draft a charter for an International Trade Organization (ITO).5 The
ITO was to be the equivalent of the IMF in the area of trade, over-
seeing a system of international trade rules.6 In 1947-48, the repre-
sentatives of fifty-three nations drafted the Havana Charter, which
would have set up such an organization. 7 During the negotiation of
4 JOHN H. JACKSON, THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM: LAW AND POLICY OF INTERNA-
TIONAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS 31-32 (1989).
5 Id. at 32.
6 JOAN E. SPERO, THE POLITICS OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS 94 (3d ed.
1985).
7 DETLEV F. VAGTS, TRANSNATIONAL BUSINESS PROBLEMS 11 (1988).
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the Havana Charter, a smaller group of nations put together a tem-
porary or stop-gap agreement to put into immediate operation many
of the Charter's terms. This General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade (GATT) became effective on January 1, 1948.8
Although the U.S. was a principal initiator of both the Havana
Charter and the ITO, the United States Congress was unwilling to
join more international organizations. United States ratification of
the Charter could not be secured. 9 When the United States with-
drew, the Charter died, along with the idea of an ITO.' 0 As a result,
GATT, which initially was to be a temporary agreement, became by
default the expression of the international consensus on trade. I I
Forty-five years later, this agreement, intended to be effective only in
the interim, is still in place.
B. Basic Provisions and Principles
In its Preamble, the GATT member states (called contracting
parties) agreed to enter into reciprocal and mutually advantageous
arrangements directed to the substantial reduction of tariffs and
other barriers to trade and to the elimination of discriminatory treat-
ment in international commerce.12 The principal purpose of GATT
was to promote a freer and more orderly international trading sys-
tem. 13 GATT was created to reduce barriers to international trade,
not to completely eliminate them. Accordingly, GATT does not aim
at completely free trade, but aims at freer trade, 14 and as such, has
been relatively successful.' 5 GATT is both a written set of rules for
the conduct of international trade and an organization that adminis-
ters those rules.
8 Id. at 11-12.
9 Although the Havana Charter was never submitted to Congress, Congress did in-
deed prevent the United States from adhering. The Charter faced opposition from the
traditionally high tariff policy of the Republican Party, from both the protectionists, who
felt that the Charter went too far, and the liberals, who felt that it did not go far enough,
and finally from business groups opposing compromises on free trade and afraid of in-
creased government involvement in trade. After delaying for three years, the Truman ad-
ministration decided in 1950 that the Charter would not be submitted to Congress, where
it would face inevitable defeat. SPERO, supra note 6, at 95.
10 SPERO, supra note 6, at 95.
11 SPERO, supra note 6, at 95.
12 THE GENERAL AGREEMENT ON TARIFFS AND TRADE, opened for signature Oct. 30, 1947,
T.I.A.S. No. 1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 187, pmb [hereinafter "GATT"].
13 Lyn MacNabb & Robert Weaver, Comment, The General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade (GATT): Has Agriculture Doomed the Uruguay Round?, 26 LAND & WATER L. REV. 761
(1991) (discussing failed negotiations of Uruguay Round).
14 VAGTS, supra note 7, at 12.
15 GATT membership has risen from the 23 original founders to 108 contracting
parties, accounting for over 90% of world trade. The tariffs on manufactured goods have
fallen from an average of 40% (1947) to roughly 5% today. Between 1950 and 1975, the
volume of trade expanded by 500%, against an increase of global output of 220%. The
GATT was highly instrumental in this spectacular change. See The ITO That Never Was,
ECONOMIST, Sept. 22, 1990 at 7.
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The basic GATT provisions and principles can be summarized
as follows:
(1) The major rule for implementing freer trade is the GAIT
principle of non-discrimination, also known as the most favored nation
(MFN) provision. Every contracting party should be treated as favor-
ably as the most favored. This is the general rule of equal treatment
for all. 16
(2) A second element of the non-discrimination principle is that
imported products must receive national treatment once imported into
the territory of another contracting party. Imports are to be ac-
corded treatment no less favorable than similar domestic products. 17
(3) A third principle is that of tariffication, with the goal to replace
non-tariff barriers (quantitative restrictions, for instance)' 8 with tar-
iffs, 19 and to promise not to raise them; 20 in other words, to bind
those tariffs at fixed maximum levels. 2' Tariff levels agreed upon
under GATT obligate each contracting party. 22 Because the impact
of tariffs is easier to appraise, tariffication will create a trade environ-
ment of greater certainty and openness.
(4) Contracting parties should meet from time to time to engage
in multilateral trade negotiations (MTN's), directed to the substantial re-
duction of tariffs and other charges.23
(5) Finally, the Agreement contemplates settlement of disputes
through consultation, conciliation and, as a last resort, dispute settle-
ment procedures. 24
C. The GA TT Dispute Settlement Procedure
To truly understand the character of GATT, it is necessary to
16 "[Any advantage, favor, privilege or immunity granted by any contracting party to
any product originating in or destined for any other country shall be accorded immediately
and unconditionally to the like product originating in or destined for the territories of all
other contracting parties." GATT, supra note 12, art. I(I).
17 GATT, supra note 12, art. 111(4).
18 Non-tariff barriers are "[r]egulations, other than traditional customs duties, used
by governments to restrict imports from, and exports to, other countries." Examples are
import quotas, licensing, variable levies and health and sanitary standards. These types of
non-tariff trade barriers have increased after World War II, while tariff rates have declined
significantly. KATHRYN L. LIPTON, U.S. DEP'T OF AGRIC., AGRICULTURE TRADE AND THE
GATT: A GLOSSARY OF TERMS 30 (Agriculture Info. Bull. No. 625, 1991) (italics omitted).
19 A tariff is a "tax imposed on commodity imports by a government. A tariff may be
either a fixed charge per unit of product imported (specific tariff) or a fixed percentage of
value (ad valorem tariff)." Id. at 40 (italics omitted).
20 GATT, supra note 12, art. XI(I).
21 For an explanation of bound tariffs, see infra note 165.
22 GATT, supra note 12, art. II.
23 GATT, supra note 12, art. XXVIII bis(l). The first GATT Round of MTN's was
held in Geneva (Switzerland, 1947), the second in Annecey (France, 1949), the third in
Torquay (England, 1951) and the Fourth again in Geneva (1956). Subsequent Rounds
were the Dillon Round (1961-62), the Kennedy Round (1964-67), the Tokyo Round
(1974-79), and the current Uruguay Round (launched in 1986).
24 GATT, supra note 12, arts. XXII-XXIII.
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make the distinction between the GATT as an organization and the
GATT as a treaty. GATT, though initially merely a multilateral
agreement, is now considered a full-time international organiza-
tion.25 The contracting parties have constructed a large organiza-
tion with many branches, headed by the executive GATT Council,
the body through which the contracting parties act. A significant im-
plication of the history of the origin of GATT, however, is that it
never became a "specialized agency" 26 affiliated with the U.N., like
the IMF and the World Bank. Therefore, GATT as an organization
functions outside the framework of the U.N. and lacks the ability to
put pressure on its contracting parties the way U.N. organizations
often can, through use of its mechanisms. 27 Most of the specialized
agencies have designed means whereby the decisions of the particu-
lar organization can be rendered virtually binding upon its member
states. 28 GATT, on the contrary, has no independent authority to
act nor any independent enforcement powers. 29 The Agreement
scarcely mentions voting, rulemaking, finance and administration, 30
thus emphasizing its lack of legal structure and enforcement.
Whereas the Havana Charter recognized the jurisdiction of the
International Court of Justice (ICJ) in certain circumstances, no such
provision is included in the GATT. Consequently, no dispute under
GATT has ever been taken to the ICJ. 3i Instead, the Agreement
provides for its own dispute settlement procedure.32 A complaining
party must first attempt to settle a dispute with another contracting
party through consultations 33 and conciliation.3" If consultations
fail, a complaining party can request the creation of a GATT panel of
independent experts to investigate the complaint. The decision to
establish a panel is made by a consensus that includes the disputing
members. The GATT panel requests information from the parties
25 KENNETH W. DAM, THE GATT: LAW AND INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ORGANIZATION
335-39 (1970).
26 Specialized agencies of the U.N. are organizations established by intergovernmen-
tal agreement and have wide international responsibilities in economic, social, cultural,
educational, health and related fields. Such an organization becomes a specialized agency
by means of an agreement made by the agency with the Economic and Social Council and
approved by the General Assembly (GA). Most of the specialized agencies agree to con-
sider recommendations made by the GA, and many of them are given a right to request
opinions from the International Court ofJustice on questions falling within their compe-
tence. Although most of the specialized agencies have no power to make decisions binding
on their members, their constituent treaties often provide for means of putting pressure
on member states to act in a particular way. See MICHAEL BARTON AKEHURST, A MODERN
INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL LAW 196 (5th ed. 1984).
27 Id. at 197.
28 Id. at 123.
29 BARRY E. CARTER & PHILLIP R. TRIMBLE, INTERNATIONAL LAW 494 (1991).
30 MacNabb & Weaver, supra note 13, at 763.
S JACKSON, supra note 4, at 91.
32 GATT, supra note 12, arts. XXII-XXIII.
33 GATT, supra note 12, art. XXII.
34 GATT, supra note 12, art. XXIII(l).
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and writes a report of its conclusions. The report is given to the
disputing parties in the hope that they will find a solution using the
panel report. If a bilateral settlement is not reached, however, the
panel report is submitted to the Council of contracting parties. The
Council decides whether or not to adopt the report. The decision is
made by a consensus that includes the disputing parties. If the
Council adopts the panel report, the charged party can decide
whether to comply and how to comply. If the complaining party is
not satisfied with the action or inaction of the charged party, it may
raise the problem again with the contracting parties. As a last resort,
the GATT Council may authorize the complaining party to retaliate
against the charged party. 35
The procedure has often been called complicated, cumbersome
and inadequate.3 6 Progress can be stalled at various stages of the
procedure. Consultations can be delayed by an interested party sim-
ply by their refusal to cooperate. Likewise, a single party can delay
the creation of a GATT panel by opposing its establishment in the
GATT Council. Even when the procedures are completed, a single
contracting party, including a party to the dispute to whom the panel
report is adverse, can indefinitely block the adoption of the panel
report in the GATT Council. Finally, there is no right of appeal of
an adverse panel report.3 7
Nevertheless, for the most part, the cases have resulted in panel
reports adopted by the GATT Council, which eventually were ac-
cepted by the losing party in the panel procedure.38 The implemen-
tation of these adopted panel reports by the losing states, however,
often is still a problem. In most instances, cases blocked by a con-
tracting party include agriculture and the European Community.39
D. GA TT and Agriculture
GATT rules cover trade in both agricultural and industrial prod-
ucts. It has been suggested that one of the objectives in the multilat-
35 GATT, supra note 12, art. XXII(2).
36 CARTER & TRIMBLE, supra note 29, at 495.
37 See Judith H. Bello & Alan F. Holmer, U.S. Trade Law and Policy Series No. 16: Settling
Disputes in the GATT: The Past Present and Future, 24 Ir'L LAW. 523 (1990). In light of these
shortcomings, the Uruguay Round includes a negotiating group on dispute settlement,
which attempts to improve the system. See id. 523-25.
38 John H. Jackson, Dolphins and Hormones: GA 77 and the Legal Environment for Interna-
tional Trade After the Uruguay Round, 14 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. J. 429, 450 (1992).
39 Famous examples of disputes between the U.S. and the EC on agricultural issues
are the "Chicken War" and the pasta-citrus dispute of the 1960s. In both cases, the EC
ignored adverse GATT panel reports. The parties eventually negotiated settlement
outside of the GATT process. See also infra note 167 and accompanying text. More re-
cently, the need for improvement is painfully illustrated by the present soybean dispute
between the United States and the EC. The Community refuses to comply with two GATT
panel findings that EC oilseeds subsidies are a violation of GATT. The United States
threatens to retaliate. See U.S. to Proceed with Sanctions Against EC over Oilseeds Dispute if no
Offer Received, 9 INT'L TRADE REP. (BNA) 961 (June 3, 1992).
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eral trade negotiations is to "make GATr rules apply to
agriculture. ' 40 The fact is that GATT rules do apply to agriculture.
However, the rules relating to agriculture are inconsistent with the
way GAT deals with industrial products.4 1 Agriculture has been
explicitly excluded from the tight disciplines that govern industrial
products.4 2 Moreover, the GATT seems to accept agricultural trade
barriers. 43 Furthermore, although agricultural trade issues were dis-
cussed at a number of MTN Rounds of the GATT, the negotiations
have produced few results.
During the negotiation of the Havana Charter, the U.S. delega-
tion recognized that the United States Senate would not ratify an
international agreement that would force the U.S. to dismantle or
suspend its agricultural programs. Thus, the U.S. insisted on special
rules for agriculture, even though special treatment was strongly op-
posed by a number of other countries. 44
As a result, the GATT rules were written to fit existing agricul-
tural support programs, whereas for industrial products, contracting
parties often brought their domestic rules in line with the GATT
rules. New GAIT rules have been adopted and interpreted to fit
national agricultural programs.45 For instance, agreement provisions
allowing agricultural exceptions from the ban on export subsidies
and quantitative restrictions were written to fit U.S. agricultural pro-
grams that were in place at the time.46 Article XVI of the GAIT
prohibits the use of export subsidies for non-primary products, but
does not extend this prohibition to agricultural commodities, which
are mostly primary products.47 As far as farm products are con-
cerned, the contracting parties are merely directed to seek to avoid
subsidies on the export of primary products. Primary products may
not be subsidized to acquire more than an equitable share of world
export trade in that product.48 However' "equitable share" is not
defined in the Agreement, and thus is open for debate.
40 DALE E. HATHAWAY, AGRICULTURE AND THE GAIT: REWRITING THE RULES 103
(1987).
41 Id.
42 Filipek, Agriculture in a World of Comparative Advantage: The Prospects for Farm Trade
Liberalization in the Uruguay Round of GA TT Negotiations, 30 HARV. INT'L L.J. 136 (1989). For a
description of the disciplines governing industrial products, see supra notes 16-22 and ac-
companying text.
43 Rose & Lansing, Third World Agricultural Development: A Proposal, 19 N.Y.U. J. INT''L
L. & POL. 71 (1986).
44 HATHAWAY, supra note 40, at 103.
45 HATHAWAY, supra note 40, at 103-04.
46 HATHAWAY, supra note 40, at 109.
47 Primary products are products which have not gone through any kind of manufac-
turing process. In the agricultural context, all trade in raw commodities is trade in primary
products. For example, tomatoes are primary products, but canned tomato sauce is a non-
primary product.
48 GAIT, supra note 12, art. XVI Section B(3). This article was adopted and put in
the Agreement in 1955. HATHAWAY, supra note 40, at 105.
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In addition, Article XI of the GAT contains two important ag-
ricultural exceptions to its general prohibition of quantitative restric-
tions. First, it excepts import and export restrictions necessary to
the application of standards or regulations for the classification,
grading and marketing of commodities in international trade.49 This
exception is crucial to the U.S. system of marketing orders of fruits
and vegetables, which may be considered a system of non-tariff trade
barriers. 50 Furthermore, it permits the use of quotas on agricultural
imports to protect domestic farm programs. 5' The quota exception
allows import controls on products that have domestic price support
and production-control programs.5 2 The U.S. sugar quotas are an
example. Article XI imposes an important restriction, however, on
the application of quotas to agricultural products. Imports may not
be restricted unless the domestic production is restricted to approxi-
mately the same extent as the imported product. 55
Even after these rules were written, largely to fit U.S. domestic
programs, the U.S. insisted in 1955 upon a "temporary" waiver from
applicable GAFT provisions requiring the restrictions on domestic
production. Section 22 of the Agricultural Adjustment Act (as
amended in 1951) requires import restrictions on agricultural prod-
ucts that interfere with the domestic farm programs notwithstanding
the provisions of any "trade agreement or other international agree-
ment heretofore or hereafter entered into by the United States." 54
Today, the waiver is still in place and is highly controversial. 55
Moreover, the breadth of the waiver granted to the most vocal pro-
49 GATT, supra note 12, art. XI(2)(b).
50 Brosch, Impact and Implications of the Current GA 77 Talks, in CONVENTION HANDBOOK,
12TH ANNUAL MEETING OF THE AALA 33-3 (1991). A marketing order is a "means author-
ized by legislation for agricultural producers to promote orderly marketing and to collec-
tively influence the supply, demand, price, or quality of particular commodities." LIPTON,
supra note 18, at 18. The (often) very detailed quality, labeling or packaging standards set
forth in marketing orders are hard to meet for potential importers and thus tend to limit
access of foreign produce to the U.S. market.
51 GATT, supra note 12, art. XI(2)(c). An import quota is the "maximum quantity or
value of a commodity allowed to enter a country during a specified time period." LIPTON,
supra note 18, at 23.
52 HATHAWAY, supra note 40, at 109. Price-support programs are "[g]overnment pro-
grams that aim to keep farm prices received by participating producers from falling below
specific minimum levels." Price support programs can be carried out through nonrecourse
loans to farmers, direct purchases or other government payments. Most major U.S. com-
modities are supported through price-support programs. LIPTON, supra note 18, at 33-34.
53 GATT, supra note 12, art. XI(2)(c)(i). The contracting parties, however, have
mostly ignored this provision.
54 For a more in depth treatment of Section 22 and agriculture, see Rex J. Zedalis,
Agricultural Trade and Section 22, 31 DRAKE L. REV. 587-620 (1981-82). Through the Trade
Agreements Extension Act (1951), Congress amended section 22 to provide that no inter-
national agreement entered into by the United States shall be applied in a manner incon-
sistent with the authority of the U.S. President to impose import limitations. In effect, this
provision directs that obligations under the GATT shall not be followed to the extent that
they would be inconsistent with section 22. Thus, section 22 prevails over all other incon-
sistent bilateral and multilateral international commitments. Id. at 616.
55 HATHAWAY, supra note 40, at 109.
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ponent of freer international trade constituted a grave blow to
GATT's prestige. 56
Finally, Article III of the Agreement provides an exception from
the "national treatment" disciplines by permitting subsidies that are
given exclusively to domestic producers. Although not limited by its
term to agriculture, Article III has broad application in the agricul-
tural sector and arguably makes a number of domestic farm support
programs consistent with GAT. For example, this provision makes
U.S. practices such as deficiency payment programs (government
payments to farmers) compatible with GATT provisions.57
II. The European Community
A. Background and History
In 1957, six sovereign states of Western Europe adopted the
Treaty of Rome 58 and created the European Economic Community
or Common Market (commonly referred to as the European Com-
munity or EC). 59 Currently, the EC has twelve member states, while
applications for membership from a number of other states are being
considered. 60 The ultimate goal is free movement of capital, goods,
persons and services within the Community (a process that is sup-
posed to be completed at the end of the magic year "Europe 1992"),
together with a common tariff and commercial policy for states
outside the Community.6' Most important for the scope of this arti-
cle is that the Community adopted a Common Agricultural Policy. 62
The EC was initially created with full U.S. support to rebuild
Europe politically and economically from the ruins of the Second
World War. The then new Federal Republic of Germany had to be
incorporated in economic and political arrangements with the rest of
56 DAM, supra note 25, at 260.
57 GATT, supra note 12, art 111.8 (b). Brosch, supra note 50, at 33-2. Deficiency pay-
ments are government payments to farmers who participate in price-support programs.
The payments are "based on the difference between the price level established by law
(target price) and either the market price" or a government loan rate, whichever is higher.
LIPTON, supra note 18, at 11. See also infra note 210 and accompanying text.
58 TREATY ESTABLISHING THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY [hereinafter EEC
Treaty]. The six initial members of the EC were Belgium, France, Italy, Luxembourg, the
Netherlands, and West Germany.
59 Technically, there are three European Communities: the European Coal and Steel
Community (ECSC) established in 1951, the European Economic Community (EEC) es-
tablished in 1957 and the European Atomic Energy Community (Euratom), also estab-
lished in 1957. A Merger Treaty, officially known as THE TREATY ESTABLISHING A SINGLE
COUNCIL AND A SINGLE COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, entered into force in
1965. This treaty did not merge the Communities themselves, but did merge the respec-
tive Community institutions. See T. HARTLEY, THE FOUNDATIONS OF EUROPEAN COMMUNITY
LAw: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW OF THE EURO-
PEAN COMMUNITY 3-4 (1986).
60 Denmark, Ireland, and the United Kingdom joined the EC in 1973; Greece joined
in 1981; Portugal and Spain joined in 1986. HARTLEY, supra note 59, at 5-6.
61 EEC Treaty, supra note 58, art. 3(a)-(c).
62 EEC Treaty, supra note 58, arts. 38-47.
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Europe. 63 An important objective was to forge a closer bond be-
tween the nations and people of Western Europe.64 The main fea-
ture of the EC is the supra-national character (or supremacy) of EC
legislation that has direct effect. Community provisions are directly ef-
fective if they become binding on the member states independent of
the implementation by national legislators. Consequently, directly
effective EC legislation prevails over national law in the event of a
conflict. Although the concepts of direct effect and supremacy are
not expressed in the Treaty of Rome, the European Court ofJustice,
one of the Community's institutions, 65 established both doctrines in
the early 1960s.6 6 The Court decides on a case-by-case basis
whether Community legislation has direct effect.
B. GA TT and the European Community
An important exemption to the principle of most favored nation
treatment and other GATT provisions is formulated in Article XXIV
of the Agreement. This article provides that the Agreement shall not
prevent the formation of customs unions or free trade areas and fur-
nishes a very large loophole for a wide variety of preferential agree-
ments. 67 The EC based its Community on the customs union
exception to the Agreement. 68 Because of its status as a customs
63 CARTER & TRIMBLE, supra note 29, at 504-05.
64 RICHARD PLENDER, PLENDER AND USHER'S CASES AND MATERIALS ON THE LAW OF
THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES 1 (1989).
65 The institutional structure of the EC consists of the Commission, the Council of
Ministers, the European Parliament, and the European Court of Justice. The Commission
(the EC's executive branch) represents the Community's interest and formulates proposals
for new Community policies, mediates between the member states, co-ordinates national
policies and oversees the execution of existing Community Policies. It consists of in-
dependent Commissioners, not being representatives of their national governments.
The Council (the legislative branch) is the body representing the member states inter-
ests. It takes the final decision on most EC legislation, concludes agreements with foreign
countries and, together with the Parliament, decides on the Community budget. It consists
of the delegates of the member states, each state being represented by a government min-
ister who is responsible for the matter being discussed.
The Parliament is intended to represent the people of the Community. In 1976, agree-
ment was reached on direct European elections. Members of the Parliament sit according
to their party, not their country. Most of the functions of the Parliament are advisory (the
Parliament only needs to be consulted), and there is hardly any legislative power. HART-
LEY, supra note 59, at 8-21.
Finally, the Court (the judicial branch) ensures the enforcement of Community law, acts
as a referee between member states and Community institutions as well as between Com-
munity institutions themselves and protects the right of the individuals. Id. at 26. The
Court established in its case law the doctrines of direct effect of Community law in the
legal systems of the individual member states and supremacy of Community law over na-
tional law.
66 Case 26/62, NV Algemene Transport-en Expeditie Onderneming Van Gend en
Loos v. Nederlandse Administratie der Belastingen, 1963 E.C.R. 1, 1963 C.M.L.R. 105. See
also case 6/64 Flaminio Costa v. ENEL, 1964 E.C.R. 585, 1964 C.M.L.R. 425 (1964).
67 JACKSON, supra note 4, at 141.
68 "The Community shall be based upon a customs union", EEC Treaty, supra note
58, art. 9(1). A customs union is a form of regional economic integration in which all
barriers on trade (like tariffs and quotas) between member states are removed, and a com-
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union under GATT, the EC member states need not grant the Com-
munity's internal trade privileges to the other GAIT contracting
parties. 69
The EC's accession to GATT in 1963 entailed complex negotia-
tions. All of the EC member states were individual contracting par-
ties to GATT before the establishment of the Community. After the
establishment of the EC, the European Court decided that the Com-
munity assumed the powers previously exercised by its member
states in the area governed by the GATT.70 It may be argued that
the EC could itself become a contracting party to GATT.7t The
Community is charged with most of the activities of the member
states in GATF. The Treaty of Rome states that the Commission, a
Community institution, is to ensure the maintenance of appropriate
relations with the GATT.72 In fact, in the field of external trade rela-
tions, the member states have now delegated their authority to the
Community. 73 Moreover, it is commonly accepted that the Commu-
nity's power over commercial policy is exclusive and leaves no room
for individual member states. 74 Consequently, the EC Commission
provides a mission at GATT, which has the exclusive authority to
negotiate on trade matters for the member states. 75 The actual con-
clusion of a GATT agreement, however, is to be undertaken by the
Council of Ministers, representing the member states. 76 Thus,
although the Community negotiates in GAIT, the member states
make the ultimate and politically sensitive decision of whether or not
to accept a trade agreement.
mon barrier is established on trade with third countries. Ritson, Introduction to the CAP, in
THE COMMON AGRICULTURAL POLICY AND THE WORLD ECONOMY: ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF
JOHN ASHTON I (C. RITSON & D. HARVEY eds. 1991). Clearly, the EC has evolved beyond
the stage of a customs union into a common market. A common market is similar to a
customs union, but, in addition, provides for the free movement of all factors of produc-
tion, capital, goods, personnel, and services. LIPTON, supra note 18, at 7, 11. Moreover, the
EC is well on its way to an Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) with a common eco-
nomic and monetary policy, a single currency and European Central Bank. See, e.g., Eco-
nomic and Monetary Union, available in LEXIS, Europe Library, Alleur File (Feb. 27, 1992).
For current setbacks on the way to further economic and monetary integration, see infra
notes 258-60 and accompanying text.
69 For a more in depth treatment of the relation between the EC and the GATT, see
Frederick M. Abbott, GA TT and the European Community: A Formula for Peaceful Coexistence, 12
MICH.J. INT'L L. 1-58 (1990); MEINHARD HILF, FRANCIS G.JACOBS & ERNST U. PETERSMANN
(eds.), THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY AND GATT (1986).
70 Cases 21-24/72, International Fruit Company N.V. v. Produktschap voor Groenten
en Fruit, 1972 E.C.R. 1219, 2 C.M.L.R. 1 (1975).
71 JACKSON, supra note 4, at 47.
72 EEC Treaty, supra note 58, art. 229.
73 EEC Treaty, supra note 58, art. 113.
74 Schwartze, Towards a 'European Foreign Policy: Legal Aspects, reprinted in CARTER &
TRIMBLE, supra note 29, at 523. The problem, however, is the exact definition of "common
commercial policy" in the Treaty. The scope of art. 113 is subject to basic disagreement
between the Commission (representing the Community's interest) and the Council (repre-
senting the interest of the member states). Id.
75 JACKSON, supra note 4, at 47.
76 JACKSON, supra note 4, at 81.
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III. The Common Agricultural Policy of the EC
A. Background and History
The Treaty of Rome required the Common Market to "extend
to agriculture and trade in agricultural products." 77 In the effort to
create a Common Market, it became clear to the six initial member
states of the Community (the Six) that agriculture could not be ex-
cluded, and moreover, that a common policy was needed. .78 At the
time the Treaty of Rome was signed, more than twenty percent of
the working population of the Six was employed in agriculture. 79
European farms were small and fragmented,8 0 agricultural income
was low, and the geographical area of the Six included many differ-
ing climatic regions. 8 1 In short, agriculture was a problem sector.
Because of the peculiar nature of agriculture and its problematic
character,8 2 national governments in Europe heavily supported their
agricultural sectors, just as most other countries did.8 3 Before the
creation of the CAP each EC member state had its own agricultural
policy. 8 4 The different systems of the Six worked as much against
each other as against imports from elsewhere. 85 To assure the free
movement of agricultural products and commodities within the Six,
it was necessary to reconcile an estimated thirty thousand different
rules and regulations relating to agriculture. 8 6 A common policy in
the field of agriculture was a necessary vehicle to create a free and
common market for agricultural products. In addition, numerous
wars and conflicts in Europe over the centuries often caused serious
food shortages. The CAP was considered a useful instrument to in-
crease agricultural production and to attain food'security by self-:suf-
ficiency in food production.8 7 It would also reduce the Community's
77 EEC Treaty, supra note 58, art. 38(1).
78 Ritson, supra note 68, at 1.
79 BRIAN E. HILL, THE COMMON AGRICULTURAL POLICY: PAST, PRESENT AND FUTURE 20
(1984).
80 The average farm size was only about five hectares (or twelve acres). OFFICE FOR
OFFICIAL PUBLICATIONS OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, A COMMON AGRICULTURAL POL-
ICY OF THE 1990s 14 (5th ed. 1989).
81 HILL, supra note 79, at 21.
82 The agricultural sector differs from other sectors of the economy because of its
dependence on resources (land and water), climate, pests, diseases and time (growing
season).
83 A number of specific reasons can be identified why governments traditionally inter-
vene in agriculture: (1) to support and stabilize farm prices and income; (2) to ensure
sufficient food supply at reasonable prices (food security); (3) to ensure the safety of food
supply; (4) to protect the capacity of agriculture by conserving the soil. RONALD K. KNUT-
SON, J.B. PENN & WILLIAM BOEHM, AGRICULTURAL & FOOD POLICY 14-15 (2d ed. 1990).
84 HILL, supra note 79, at 18-19.
85 Gavin Strang, E.E.C. Agricultural Policy, in THE YEARBOOK OF WORLD AFFAIRS 1979
55, 56 (1979).
86 ROSEMARY FENNELL, THE COMMON AGRICULTURAL POLICY OF THE EUROPEAN COM-
MUNITY: ITS INSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE ORGANIZATION 6 (1979).
87 STANLEY ANDREWS, AGRICULTURE AND THE COMMON MARKET 13-14 (1973).
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dependence on imports and the unpredictable world market.88
Finally, the seeming incompatibility between the two largest ini-
tial member states, France and Germany, needed to be resolved. It
became clear that France, a major low-cost agricultural producer,
would never agree to open its market for industrial goods if Ger-
many, with its vast, modern and efficient industrial complex, would
not open its market for agricultural products. The CAP gave France
what it desired without harming the interests of Germany.8 9
B. The Common Agricultural Policy
Because of the social, economic and political importance of agri-
culture, the EC adopted a Common Agricultural Policy. This CAP is
a set of regulations by which the member states of the EC seek to
merge their individual agricultural programs into a unified effort to
reach certain objectives. 90 The CAP defines principles, guidelines
and mechanisms for controlling agricultural markets and for re-
shaping farming practices and structures in the Community.9 1 It is
generally viewed as the world's most highly developed form of
supra-national law and institutional regulation. 92
The Treaty of Rome mentions five broad objectives of the CAP:
(a) to increase agricultural productivity by promoting technical pro-
gress and by ensuring the rational development of agricultural pro-
duction and the optimum utilization of the factors of production, in
particular labour;
(b) thus to ensure a fair standard of living for the agricultural com-
munity, in particular by increasing the individual earnings of per-
sons engaged in agriculture;
(c) to stabilize markets;
(d) to assure the availability of supplies; and
(e) to ensure that supplies reach consumers at reasonable prices. 93
An alternative way of characterizing the CAP is by its three basic
principles: the single market, Community preference, and financial
solidarity. These were formulated somewhat obscurely during the
early 1960s, but eventually provided the basis of agricultural policy
in Europe. The EC has pointed out numerous times that any reform
of the CAP must not call into question the three principles upon
which it was founded. 9 4
The principle of a single market, or market unity, means the free
88 Agriculture, available in LEXIS, Europe Library, Alleur File, at 4 (Feb. 13, 1992).
89 p. j. G. KAPTEYN & P. VERLOREN VAN THEMAAT, INLEIDING TOT HET RECHT VAN DE
EUROPESE GEMEENSCHAPPEN [Introduction to the Law of the European Communities] 418
(3rd ed. 1980).
90 LIPTON, supra note 18, at 7. For a description of those objectives, see infra note 93
and accompanying text.
91 Agiculture, supra note 88, at 2.
92 IAN R. BOWLER, AGRICULTURE UNDER THE COMMON AGRICULTURAL POLICY: A GEOG-
RAPHY xi (1985).
93 EEC Treaty, supra note 58, art. 39(1).
94 Ritson, supra note 68, at 2.
[VOL. 18
AGRICULTURE DISPUTE
movement of agricultural products within the Community, without
any customs duties, equivalent charges or subsidies, or any other ob-
stacles. It requires the common organization of commodity markets,
the introduction of common prices, a uniform import and export
policy at the EC's external borders, the harmonization of regula-
tions, and stable currency parities.95
Community preference means that priority must be given to the sale
of Community produce over imports from non-member states.
Since these Community products are usually higher-priced than
those on the world market,96 a variable levy on cheaper imports from
third countries was established to protect the internal market from
low priced imports and excessive world market fluctuations. 97 Fi-
nally,financial solidarity means that the costs and benefits of the CAP
should be shared by all concerned. Accordingly, the funds required
to finance the CAP should be provided jointly by the member states,
irrespective of which will benefit most from the expenditure on agri-
culture. Also, the income generated by the operation of the policy is
part of the Community's resources. 98 The total EC budget is formed
by the proceeds from customs duties, the variable import levies of
the CAP, and a value added tax (VAT), currently 1.4%, imposed on
the member states. Approximately two-thirds of the Community's
budget is spent on agriculture. 99
The European Agricultural Guidance and Guarantee Fund (the
EAGGF) was created to put the principle of financial solidarity into
practice. As its name indicates, EAGGF consists of two parts. The
guarantee section finances Community expenditures under the mar-
ket and price policies of the CAP and picks up sixty percent of the
money spent on agriculture. The various types of intervention (such
as the purchase and storage of commodities) and the export refunds
are financed from this section of the fund.
The guidance section provides the resources for the common
policy of agricultural structures. 00 This policy attempts to address
the structural problems within and the disparities between different
agricultural regions of the EC member states at a Community level.
The structural policy aims at increasing production at small ineffi-
cient agricultural holdings, provides extra support for hill-farming
95 ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, NATIONAL POLI-
CIES AND AGRICULTURAL TRADE: STUDY ON THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY 60 (1987).
96 For an explanation of the reasons for the choice for a system of high guaranteed
prices above world market levels, see infra notes 148-57 and accompanying text.
97 ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC Co-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, Supra note 95, at
61. For a discussion of the variable levy, see infra notes 119-22 and accompanying text.
98 ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, supra note 95, at
61-62.
99 Id. at 58.
100 OFFICE FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATIONS OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, supra note 80,
at 34-36.
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and other less-favored areas in agriculture, offers early retirement
for older farmers and retrains younger farmers willing to discontinue
their operation 101
C. The Market and Price Policies
To achieve the goals of the CAP, formulated in the Treaty of
Rome, the EC created a common organization of agricultural mar-
kets. 0 2 This organization consists of several different forms of mar-
ket intervention which are specific to each sector of agricultural
production. The extent of Community intervention varies by com-
modity. The diversity and complexity of the measures the CAP em-
ploys to implement the different forms of organization are
immense. 10 3 Some of these measures are similar for all sectors,
others are common to several sectors, while others apply to one sec-
tor only. Obviously, not every type of agricultural produce is avail-
able in European agriculture. In this context, the reader should be
reminded that, despite its market and price policies, the EC is the
world's biggest- importer of agricultural products.
The common organization of the market in grains may be taken
as the basic model of a fully developed Community-market organiza-
tion. First, because grains are an important cash crop on a large
number of farms in Europe, ' 0 4 the common organization of the mar-
ket in grains was the first CAP support system to be adopted and
worked out in depth. The arrangements adopted served as a model
for other products requiring full support regimes.10 5 Second, be-
cause grains are major cost components for the livestock industries,
the common organization of the markets in pigmeat, poultrymeat
and eggs is treated as auxiliary to the market in cereals.' 0 6 Although
dairying and beef production are mainly grass-based in Europe,
grains are also a major cost item in these sectors.' 0 7 Finally, be-
cause grains are easy to store and transport, they play an important
role in agricultural trade.108 Traditionally, grain has been the sector
in which the U.S. and the EC have been furthest apart.
101 See id. at 25-32.
102 EEC Treaty, supra note 58, art 40(2)(c).
103 SIMON HARRIS, ALAN SWINBANK & GuY WILKINSON, THE FOOD AND FARM POLICIES
OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY 44 (1983).
104 BOWLER, supra note 92, at 112.
105 HARRIS ET AL., supra note 103, at 61-62.
106 J. A. USHER, LEGAL ASPECTS OF AGRICULTURE IN THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY 53
(1988).
107 HARRIS ET AL., supra note 103, at 61.




(i) The Price Regime of the Grain Market'0 9
The Council of Agricultural Ministers of the member states of
the EC sets a target price for grains at the beginning of each marketing
year. This price is the outcome of a process of political negotiation
and is usually set above world market price levels, to reflect the
higher production costs in the Community compared to other major
agricultural producers." 0 The target price is the price producers are
supposed to obtain, but is not in itself available to farmers."'l
The intervention price, on the other hand, is the price guaranteed
to the producer. It is the price at which national intervention agen-
cies will purchase grains from producers to raise prices to target
price levels; hence, it represents the guaranteed minimum price for
farmers.' 12 Purchased grains are eventually put back into the market
by the intervention bodies under conditions avoiding market deteri-
oration, 13 or are disposed of on the world market at knock-down
prices." 4 The target prices are set at Duisburg (Germany), which
represents the point of maximum deficit for grains in the Commu-
nity. 115 The intervention price is set at Ormes (France), the area of
maximum grains surplus in the Community. 1 6 Although both tar-
get and intervention prices are set by the Council in response to
political pressures, the difference between the target price and the
intervention price is intended to reflect, first, the transport costs be-
tween Ormes and Duisburg, and second, a certain marketing
109 Because of the enormous complexity of the matter, the following description is
only an outline of the Community's agricultural market and price regimes. Many details
will be left unstated, and small amendments will not be covered.
110 ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, supra note 95, at
60. Because of the different currencies of the member states, agricultural prices are ini-
tially set in European Currency Units (ECU). The ECU is a weighted average of EC curren-
cies which is currently used for internal EC accounting purposes. The common prices are
then converted into the national currencies of the twelve member states by using green
rates, special rates of exchange established to create stable agricultural prices. A compli-
cated system of monetary compensatory amounts compensates for currency fluctuations. The
system was created to avoid fluctuation in national farm prices and speculation. This
agrimonetary system is considered incompatible with the completion of the common mar-
ket of "Europe 1992" and needs to be eliminaied. See Timothy E. Josling and Walter H.
Gardiner, Dismantling the EC's Agrimonetary System: Effects on European Agriculture, in EC 1992:
IMPLICATIONS FOR WORLD FOOD AND AGRICULTURAL TRADE 7-20 (D. KELCH ed. 1991) (U.S.
Dep't of Agric., Staff Rep. No. AGES 9133, 1991). Recent plans for further monetary inte-
gration in the Community anticipate the ECU as the EC's single European. currency by no
later than January 1, 1999. See infra note 259 and accompanying text.
III USHER, supra note 106, at 54, 59.
112 USHER, supra note 106, at 54, 59.
113 Giancarlo Olmi, Common Organization of Agricultural Markets at the Stage of the Single
Market, 5 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 359, 373 (1967-68).
114 FENNELL, supra note 86, at 108.
115 Duisburg is located in the heart of the German Ruhr area, the most industrialized
area of Europe, representing the area of maximum grain deficit in the EC.
116 Ormes is located in the heart of the Paris Basin, Europe's grain basket, represent-
ing the area of maximum grain surplus in the EC.
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(ii) Border Protection Mechanisms
To protect the internal Community market from cheaper im-
ports, a threshold price is applied at the borders of the Community as
the minimum import price for grains. The threshold price is calcu-
lated so that the selling price for imported grains on the Duisburg
market will be the same as the target price for Community produced
grains."l 8 It ensures that the EC target price cannot be undercut by
cheaper imports from third countries.' 1 9 Accordingly, the threshold
price is derived from the target price by allowing for transportation
costs from the Community frontier to Duisburg, the point of maxi-
mum grain deficit. 120 Threshold prices are fixed for Rotterdam (The
Netherlands), the EC's main grain import harbor. In the case of im-
ports, a variable import levy is charged, which covers the full difference
between world prices (c.i.f. Rotterdam) and EC threshold prices. 121
The levy increases when world market prices decrease relative to the
threshold price and vice versa. Consequently, the levy has the effect
of raising the world market price for grain imports into the EC to the
Community's threshold price level.
In the case of exports of Community grains, which are usually
higher-priced than on the world market, export restitutions or refunds
are granted to enable EC-produced grains to be competitive. The
export restitution represents the difference between the average
world price and the usually higher internal Community price, the in-
tervention price. 122 Most of the time, however, the amount of the
refund awarded to an EC exporter is higher than the actual differ-
ence between world market price and EC intervention price, thus en-
abling EC exporters to undercut other exporters in third country
markets. 12 3 Therefore, it has been the system of export refunds that
has given rise to the greatest number of complaints from the EC's
trading partners. The United States, in particular, established its Ex-
port Enhancement Program (EEP) to counter the effects of this form
of EC export subsidies.l2 4
Although not very likely, it is also possible that world market
117 HARRIS ET AL., supra note 103, at 66.
118 USHER, supra note 106, at 55.
119 FENNELL, supra note 86, at 109.
120 HARRIS ET AL., supra note 103, at 66.
121 HARRIS ET AL., supra note 103, at 66.
122 FENNELL, supra note 86, at 110.
123 HARRIS ET AL., supra note 103, at 67.
124 The EEP program was created in the spring of 1985, mainly to counter EC export
subsidies. The program was designed to help U.S. exporters meet competitors' prices in
subsidized markets by awarding generic commodity certificates which are redeemable for
Commodity Credit Corporations-owned commodities. This enables the exporters to sell
certain commodities to specified countries at prices below those of the U.S. market. LIp-
TON, supra note 18, at 15.
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prices may rise above EC's threshold prices. In that event, the Com-
munity can impose export levies on its own exports, to prevent internal
prices from rising to the then higher world market prices. This sce-
nario actually happened during the world commodity boom in the
years 1973-75.125 In a situation like this, import subsidies can be
granted on imports to bring import prices down to Community
levels. 126
(iii) Mechanisms to Limit Over-production
In its original form, the common organization of the market in
grains created an open ended commitment of the intervention agen-
cies to buy whatever is produced. The guaranteed outlet at a guar-
anteed high price isolates EC grain farmers from the correction
mechanism of demand and supply and hence encourages significant
over-production.' 27 For example, in the period from 1960 to 1985
the EC's self-sufficiency in grain production rose from 84% to over
125%.128
In an attempt to reduce and possibly prevent over-production,
the EC introduced a number of mechanisms in the 1980s to better
control the production of grains. Under a system of agricultural
budget stabilizers, maximum guaranteed quantities (MGQ) of produc-
tion are adopted at a political level by the Council of Agricultural
Ministers. MGQ serve as a production ceiling beyond which costs
and other penalties apply. If production of grains exceeds this pro-
duction level, co-responsibility levies will automatically lower the inter-
vention price up to five percent.' 29 If farmers enroll in a set-aside
program and put fifteen percent of their land under grains out of
production, however, they can escape part of this levy. In addition,
grain farmers can also qualify for per hectare set-aside payments.' 30
Unfortunately, these mechanisms have failed to limit grain produc-
tion. EC grain intervention stocks climbed to a record high of 18.8
million tons in 1991, and are estimated to substantially increase in
1992.131
The market regime for grains, though the most important, is
certainly not the only mechanism of market intervention. The CAP
consists of twenty different market organizations. Most other mar-
kets follow the basic structure adopted for the grain market. How-
ever, the terminology and ramifications differ according to the
125 KAPTEYN & VERLOREN VAN THEMAAT, supra note 89, at 413.
126 Agriculture, supra note 88, at 15-16.
127 USHER, supra note 106, at 56.
128 JULIUS ROSENBLATr ET AL. , THE COMMON AGRICULTURAL POLICY: PRINCIPLES AND
CONSEQUENCES 28, Table 9 (1988).
129 Agriculture, supra note 88, at 16-17.
ISO Grains, in U.S. DEP'T OF AGRIC., R.S.-91-4, WESTERN EUROPE: AGRICULTURE AND
TRADE REPORT 22 (Situation and Outlook Series, Oct. 1991).
131 EC Intervention Stocks of Grain Reach Record High, id. at 60.
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product concerned. Every product and group of products available
in European agriculture is subject to its own particular market
organization. ' 3 2
Some markets adopted measures specific for a certain commod-
ity. For instance, heavy surplus production in the dairy sector has
given rise to drastic remedies. Quotas for milk production were intro-
duced in 1984 and their levels were reduced in subsequent years. In
the quota system, a reference quantity is allocated at either the farm
level or the level of the milk purchaser. If the quota is exceeded, the
farmer or purchaser is subject to a superlevy equal to 100% of the
intervention price' 33 (in 1989 enhanced to 115% of the intervention
price),' 3 4 effectively prohibiting production beyond quota levels.
Despite these adjustments, dairy stocks reached record levels in
1991.13 5
(iv) Recent Reforms of the Grain Market
The Commission of the EC expressed deep concern about the
surplus production and excessive stocks in the MacSharry Proposal
of February 199 1.136 The Commission emphasized the need for fun-
damental reform. First, it proposed a thirty-five percent cut in sup-
port prices for grains by 1996. The existing stabilizer arrangements,
including the co-responsibility levies and the MGQs, would subse-
quently be withdrawn.' 3 7 Furthermore, it introduced direct pay-
ments (more or less de-coupled payments) 3 8 to compensate farmers
for this decrease in support prices.' 3 9 In addition, grain farmers
would have to comply with certain set-aside provisions. Farms larger
than twenty hectares140 would have to set aside fifteen percent of
132 Agriculture, supra note 88, at 11.
133 Graham Avery, Agricultural Policy: The Conclusions of the European Council, 25 COMMON
MKT. L. REV. 523, 529 (1988). Although the author mentions 100% of the target price, I
think that 100% of the intervention price is more correct, since that is the price directly
available to producers.
134 P.J. TEUNISSEN, EUROPEAN COOPERATION AND INTEGRATION: THE RESHAPING OF A
CONTINENT 13.6 (1990).
135 See generally Dairy, in U.S. DEP'T OF AGRIC., supra note 130, at 36.
136 Ray McSharry, Foreward, COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, THE DEVEL-
OPMENT AND FUTURE OF THE COMMON AGRICULTURAL POLICY: PROPOSALS OF THE COMMIS-
SION (Feb. 1991) [hereinafter MacSharry Proposal]. Ray MacSharry is the Irish Agricultural
Commissioner of the EC Commission.
137 Id. at 9.
138 De-coupled payments are income support in the form of direct payments to the
farmer unrelated to the level of production. They represent a radical departure from the
EC's traditional commodity-based support policy. Obviously, there is a welfare stigma as-
sociated with direct payments. David Harvey, The Production Entitlement Guarantee (PEG) Op-
tion, in THE COMMON AGRICULTURAL POLICY AND THE WORLD ECONOMY: ESSAYS IN HONOUR
OF JOHN ASHTON, supra note 68, at 314. The direct payments proposed by the MacSharry
plan, however, would not be completely de-coupled. See infra note 145 and accompanying
text.
139 MacSharry Proposal, supra note 136, at 9-10.
140 One hectare is 2.47 acres.
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their arable cropland to be eligible for the direct payments. Farms
smaller than twenty hectares would not have to set aside any land. 14
These proposals amount to the most fundamental reform to
date of the mechanisms of the CAP, while keeping intact the three
basic CAP principles outlined above.142 Furthermore, the proposed
EC agricultural support system would function more like the U.S.
system than before, thus increasing the chances for a compromise on
agriculture in the Uruguay Round. 143 Although the Council of Agri-
cultural Ministers of the EC indicated that it would not accept the
proposal in the form in which it was initially presented, it did agree
to a far-reaching reform package in May 1992. 44 The centerpiece of
the reforms is that in the grain sector, guaranteed support prices will
be cut by twenty-nine percent over a three-year period ending in
1996. The grain co-responsibility levy will be abolished. To receive
direct subsidies as a compensation for the cut in support prices, big-
ger farmers must set fifteen percent of their grain acreage aside. The
direct payments will not be de-coupled completely from production:
payments will be linked not to output itself, but to the area of land
under grains and to a regional measure of yields. 145 The price cut in
the grain sector opens the door to price cuts in other sectors as well.
As a result of the cut in support prices, export subsidies will fall sig-
nificantly by 1997.146 The reform package was hailed by the Com-
munity as "the most important development in the 30-year history of
the CAP."' 147
D. The Choice for High Guaranteed Prices
An important objective of the Treaty of Rome was to ensure a
fair standard of living for the agricultural community. The creators
of the CAP opted for a system of high guaranteed minimum prices to
grant the farmer income parity with the non-agricultural sectors. As
a result, the main characteristic of the CAP is that for over seventy
percent of agricultural production, EC farmers are guaranteed a high
minimum price on the Community market, thus isolating them from
141 MacSharry Proposal, supra note 136, at 12-13.
142 EC Farm Commissioner Ray MacSharry, MacSharry Proposal, supra note 136,
Foreword.
143 An EC system with lower guaranteed prices and compensation through de-coupled
payments corresponds roughly with the U.S. system of relatively low target prices and
deficiency payments as a means of making up for the difference between market price and
target price.
144 See Farm Ministers Approve Overhaul of EC's Common Agricultural Policy, 9 brr'L TRADE
REP. (BNA) 914-15 (May 27, 1992).
145 The CAP and the GATT: America Must Let Europe's New Farm Deal Unlock the Uruguay
Round, ECONOMIST, May 23, 1992, at 20.
146 EC Farm Policy: Getting Better, ECONOMIST, May 23, 1992, at 55-56.
147 EC Council Approves CAP Reform Plan, FEEDSTUFFS, May 25, 1992, at I (quoting EC
Agricultural Commissioner Ray MacSharry).
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the world market.148 The choice for high Community prices resulted
in a system with obligatory intervention purchases, variable levies on
imports, refunds on exports, serious over-production, and a soaring
budget. The costs of purchasing, storing and disposing of the sur-
plus production are almost unbearable for the Community.149
A number of factors resulted in the choice for high internal
prices to support agricultural income. First, formulating a common
policy to suit and reconcile a diversity of existing support systems
was a necessary, but not an easy, task. Agreement on prices, for in-
stance, was reached with great difficulty. In the end, it was politically
more acceptable for the Ministers of Agriculture of the member
states to agree to prices that were higher than their own national
prices. 150 Furthermore, price support was initially considered less
expensive and less bureaucratic than direct financial aid, because of
the large number of farmers involved and the different national eco-
nomic conditions.'15 It was also the most common type of market
intervention in the member states, and thus radical change was
avoided. 152 In addition, the Six already had a long tradition of pro-
tectionism, 153 making it relatively easy to incorporate the necessary
variable levy to limit access to the Community market and to protect
the higher-priced European agricultural products. As a result, the
Community became far more protectionist after the CAP was intro-
duced than when its component states acted separately.' 54 Finally,
because production costs were higher in the EC than in the other
main producing countries, it was believed that EC prices could, and
had to be, established above world market prices, without necessarily
leading to serious over-production. 155 Significant surplus produc-
tion was simply not foreseen. Additionally, the world commodity
price boom of the early 1970s "led the architects of the CAP to be-
lieve that EC price levels were not grossly out of line with world mar-
ket prices."' 1 6 That circumstances worked out quite differently was
mainly due to the fact that the introduction of the CAP coincided
with a period of technological progress and massive explosion in
world productivity resulting in chronic over-production of many ag-
148 Agriculture, supra note 88, at 8. Currently, about 90% of agricultural production in
the EC is in one way or another covered by the CAP. The only major farm products not
covered by CAP are potatoes and agricultural alcohol.
149 OFFICE FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATIONS OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, supra note 80,
at 53. For a specific dollar amount in comparison with the U.S., see infra note 245.
150 HILL, supra note 79, at 26.
151 OFFICE FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATIONS OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, supra note 80,
at 21.
152 OFFICE FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATIONS OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, supra note 80,
at 21.
153 Strang, supra note 85, at 59.
154 BUCKWELL ET AL., supra note 108, at 11.
155 ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, supra note 95, at
60.




E. The External Effects of the CAP
Apart from the drawbacks of the system of high guaranteed min-
imum prices at a national level (high food prices for the consumer
and a burden on the taxpayers) and at a Community level (surplus
production and mounting cost), the EC's CAP has serious trade con-
sequences on a global scale. Consequently, the CAP has given rise
to a large number of complaints from the EC's trading partners.
The first controversial external effect of the system of high
prices is that access to the Community market needs to be limited.
Because world commodity prices tend to fluctuate, flat import duties
would not be sufficient to protect EC production from cheaper im-
ports. Therefore, the CAP established its variable import levies, ad-
justable to the level of world prices. The result is that no matter how
competitive third countries' agricultural products are, import into
the Community will not be possible at prices below the threshold
price level,' 58 and may not be possible at all. Effectively, the variable
levy is a means of keeping cheaper foreign farm products out of the
Common Market to protect the position of EC farmers. 15 9
Second, because of the high prices, EC production of agricul-
tural commodities is much higher than it otherwise would have been
at world market prices. Equally, consumption is lower. Export is the
only way to dispose of resulting surpluses. Over-production and
high "domestic" prices create the necessity of an export subsidy to
make the agricultural surpluses competitive on the world market.
The chances for EC exporters to sell produce on the world market at
Community prices would be virtually nonexistent under normal mar-
ket conditions. However, the export subsidy not only makes Com-
munity products more competitive, but it often provides the
Community exporter with a means to undercut the world price as
well. This enables her to move into export markets that traditionally
belonged to third countries, hence grabbing a greater share of the
world market. Furthermore, the export subsidies tend to have a de-
pressing effect on prices at the world market by making it a dumping
place for Community surpluses, thus seriously lowering both the ex-
port revenues of agricultural exporting countries and the incomes of
producers in food importing countries.' 60 This can be especially
harsh on developing countries that often completely rely on agricul-
157 HILL, supra note 79, at 35.
158 HARRIS ET AL., supra note 103, at 254.
159 J. Kodwo Bentil, Attempts to Liberalize International Trade in Agriculture and the Problem
of the External Aspects of the Common Agricultural Policy of the European Economic Community, 17
CASE W. RES. J. INr'L L. 335, 358 (1985).
160 Id. at 360-365.
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tural exports for economic development. 16 1
Finally, but more indirectly, European agriculture is protected
by a number of other measures both under the CAP and national
legislation. These include tax allowances, capital grants and subsi-
dies for research and development. All these measures have the ef-
fect of expanding the volume of produce available for export and
thus intensifying the impact on the rest of the world. 162
F. The CAP and the GATT
The CAP has been severely criticized for its external effects by a
number of countries, especially the United States. The United States
can be held primarily responsible, however, for the adoption of the
GATT as a trade agreement with broad exceptions for domestic agri-
cultural programs. 16 3 This, together with the 1955 GATT waiver
obtained by the United States, gave the EC the opportunity to estab-
lish the CAP without seriously violating GAT customs and prac-
tices. Since GATT rules and mechanisms do not prevent import
restrictions on agricultural products, 164 the CAP's variable levy, for
example, is probably legal under GAT as a tariff on products that
are not bound.16 5 However, the variable aspect of the levy certainly
defeats one of the basic policies behind the GAT's preference for
fixed tariffs as trade restrictions. If the tariff were fixed, efficient for-
eign producers would be able to penetrate the EC market by lower-
ing their prices. 16 6 Because most other GATT contracting parties
have import restrictions of some kind, there has been little official
objection to the EC's variable levy from third countries. 16 7 Conse-
quently, the legality of the variable levy has never been the subject of
a GATT ruling.' 68 Nevertheless, the U.S. has pushed for a disman-
tling of the variable levy during the Kennedy and Tokyo Rounds of
the GATF.' 6 9 The Community, however, made it clear that this levy
161 Rose & Lansing, supra note 43, at 64.
162 Allan Buckwell, The CAP and World Trade, in THE COMMON AGRICULTURAL POLICY
AND THE WORLD ECONOMY: ESSAYS IN HONOUR OFJOHN ASHTON, supra note 68, at 223, 268.
163 See supra notes 44-57 and accompanying text.
164 Bentil, supra note 159, at 357.
165 JACKSON, supra note 4, at 44. A binding is a maximum tariff: contracting parties are
obligated under the GATT treaty not to allow their tariffs on a particular product to ex-
ceed the GATT binding. When no binding exists, which is the case with most agricultural
products, a country may charge any tariff amount it pleases. Id. at 119. For a discussion of
the CAP's variable levy, see supra note 122 and accompanying text.
166 JACKSON, supra note 4, at 131.
167 Bentil, supra note 159, at 357. There have been, however, significant disputes be-
tween the United States and the EC. For instance, during the "Chicken War", the United
States complained of being excluded by CAP restrictions from the German poultry market.
The GATT panel decision favoring the United States was ignored by the Community. The
U.S. was allowed to retaliate. Filipek, supra note 42, at 146.
168 Agriculture, supra note 88, at 55.
169 The Kennedy and Tokyo Rounds are the two GATT rounds of multinational trade
negotiations that preceded the current Uruguay Round. Both Rounds hesitatingly at-
tempted to address agricultural issues, but little was accomplished. For an overview of
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was part of one of the basic CAP principles, and therefore was not
negotiable. 17 0
The export restitution or subsidy is criticized more frequently,
especially by the U.S. and other large agricultural exporters. 17'
However, in 1958, the U.S. was foremost among those countries that
refused to endorse an absolute prohibition on the use of export sub-
sidies. 172 Therefore, GATT allowed export subsidies to continue to
be used for agricultural ("primary") products, subject to the condi-
tion that a country was not allowed to gain "more than an equitable
share of world trade", a term nowhere defined.'17 During the Tokyo
Round, the contracting parties adopted a Subsidies Code, which at-
tempted to strengthen existing GAIT disciplines on the use of agri-
cultural subsidies. Although an attempt was made to refine the
"equitable share of world trade" rule, application of the Code to ag-
ricultural subsidies has been ineffective.' 74 In recent years, con-
tracting parties have initiated dispute settlement complaints against
EC export subsidies. The complaints have not resulted, however, in
a prohibition of the export restitution system.175
G. The Difficulties of Reform
Because of its obvious drawbacks at national, Community and
international levels, the CAP has been subject to endless proposals
for reform. Apart from the recently adopted reform package,' 76 lit-
tle has been accomplished. As is the case with agricultural policy in
general,' 77 the CAP is hard to reform for a number of reasons. First,
Community policy-making is far more complex than at a national
level, since it requires a considerable degree of consultation, negoti-
ation and compromise between the member state bureaucracies.' 78
Although not formally demanded by the Treaty, decisions require
agricultural issues during the Kennedy and Tokyo Rounds, see Bentil, supra note 159, at
338-49.
170 MICHEL PETIT, INTERNATIONAL FOOD POLICY RESEARCH INSTITUTE, DETERMINANTS
OF AGRICULTURAL POLICIES IN THE UNITED STATES AND THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY 57-58
(1985). For an explanation of the CAP's basic principles, see supra notes 94-99 and accom-
panying text.
171 Among the most critical countries are the Cairns Group members Australia, Can-
ada, Argentina and Brazil. For a discussion of the CAP's export restitution, see supra notes
122-124 and accompanying text.
172 HARRIS ET AL., supra note 103, at 275.
173 See supra note 48 and accompanying text.
174 Filipek, supra note 42, at 145.
175 OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, 1991 NATIONAL TRADE Es-
TIMATE REPORT ON FOREIGN TRADE BARRIERS 73 (1991).
176 For a discussion of the reform plan, see supra notes 142-147 and accompanying
text.
177 See James T. Bonnen & William P. Browne, Why is Agricultural Policy So Difficult to
Reform?, in THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF US AGRICULTURE CHALLENGES FOR THE 1990s 7, 7-
29 (Carol S. Kramer ed., 1989).
178 BOWLER, supra note 92, at 27.
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unanimity among the member states.' 79 National interests usually
differ considerably, often making unanimity almost impossible.' 80
The large political influence wielded by the national farm lobbies
within the member states on the national departments of agriculture
hinders significant reforms.' 8 ' Moreover, with the possible excep-
tion of the United Kingdom and the Netherlands, EC member states
represent agricultural interests almost to the exclusion of all other
interests. ' 8 2
Second, the entry of new member states in 1973, 1981 and 1986
further complicated. the decision-making process. Expansion also
caused more over-production, a greater financial burden on the
budget and more frequent and bitter trade disputes.183 New mem-
ber states were basically unable to effect any fundamental changes in
Europe's agricultural policy in their negotiations for membership.18 4
Finally, CAP was and still is considered the cornerstone of the
EC, the glue that holds the Community together. Changing the ba-
sic principles of the CAP would change the basis of the EC itself.
Therefore, the basic principles of the CAP have so far been virtually
untouchable. Agriculture became the first area in which member
states transferred national sovereignty to the Community.18 5 It thus
became the EC's first and most important common policy, far more
important than anything else. As a result, progress in a number of
other fields took place only as a result of the accomplishments of the
CAP, 8 6 effectively preparing sovereign states for the things to come.
179 The Treaty of Rome states: "Save as otherwise provided in this Treaty, the Council
shall act by majority of its members." EEC Treaty, supra note 58, art. 148(l). In 1966,
however, the Council adopted the so-called Luxembourg Compromise, providing that the
Council would try to reach a decision unanimously whenever a member state pleads that
its vital national interest is involved. Effectively, this gave each individual member state a
veto over the decision process. HARTLEY, supra note 59, at 12-14. Although the Single
European Act, which came into force in 1987, re-introduced the majority voting in a
number of fields, decisions on agriculture are extremely hard to reach and generally are
taken unanimously. Agricultural decision-making by majority will take place only in excep-
tional situations.
180 ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC Co-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, supra note 95, at
137.
181 BOWLER, supra note 92, at 43. For an explanation of the significant role of farm
lobbies in the EC, see H. WAYNE MOYER & TIMOTHY E. JOSLING, AGRICULTURAL POLICY
REFORM: POLITICS AND PROCESS IN THE EC AND THE USA 42-48 (1990).
182 MOYER &JOSLING, supra note 181, at 100.
183 Christian H. Jensen, The European Community's Common Agricultural Policy Predicament:
Exacerbation by Spain and Portugal's Entry and Proposed Solutions, 1990 B.Y.U. L. REv. 1709,
1713. In addition, the re-unification of Germany in October 1990 made the CAP also ap-
plicable in the former East Germany. The adjustment and integration process is expected
to take a considerable amount of time. German Unification One Year Later, in U.S. DEP'T OF
AGRIC., supra note 130, at 52. For instance, bringing former East Germany into the EC,
added about twelve tons of grain production, but only increased consumption by an esti-
mated eight million tons, thus increasing EC intervention stocks for grains. Grains, supra
note 130, at 20; EC Intervention Stocks of Grain Reached Record High, supra note 131, at 60.
184 BOWLER, supra note 92, at 56.
185 HILL, supra note 79, at 119.
186 Strang, supra note 85, at 56.
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The CAP called for more coordination in the economic and mone-
tary policies of the member states. The necessity to harmonize and
centralize decision-making strengthened the position of Community
institutions, in particular the Commission and the European Court
of Justice. The agricultural case law before the Court significantly
contributed to the development of the principles and the supra-na-
tional character of Community law. 187 Moreover, the CAP is gener-
ally considered as having prevented the Community from falling
apart at various times of stagnation and crisis.' 88 It is only a modest
exaggeration to say that without the CAP, the Community itself
would never have been formed.'8 9
IV. The GATT Uruguay Round and Agriculture
A. The Initial Phase
After little success on the issue of agriculture in seven subse-
quent GATT Rounds, a GATT Ministerial Declaration called in No-
vember 1982 for the establishment of a Committee on Trade in
Agriculture (CTA) to make recommendations for achieving greater
liberalization in world agricultural trade.' 90 The Declaration paved
the way for a new GATT Round with considerable attention to be
focused on agriculture. Accordingly, in September 1986, the eighth
GATT round of trade negotiations was launched in Punta del Este,
Uruguay. There, the contracting parties of GAT formally agreed to
a new series of multilateral negotiations known as the Uruguay
Round. "The official statement of principles and objectives for the
talks, the Punta del Este Ministerial Declaration, devoted more time
to agriculture than to any of the other subjects scheduled for
negotiations."' 9 '
The Punta del Este Declaration stated that the
Contracting Parties agree that there is an urgent need to bring
more discipline and predictability to world agricultural trade by cor-
187 KAlrEYN & VERLOREN VAN THEMAAT, supra note 89, at 418-20. For a discussion of
the supra-national character of Community law, see supra notes 65-66 and accompanying
text.
188 Strang, supra note 85, at 56.
189 Mahler, Domestic & International Sources of Trade Policy: The Case of Agriculture in the
European Community & the United States 24 POLITY 33 (1991). France, for example, might not
have entered the Common market without the CAP, and European integration in its cur-
rent form is hard to imagine without France's participation. See supra note 89 and accompa-
nying text.
190 U.S. GEN. ACcT. OFF. [GAO], AGRICULTURAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS: INITIAL PHASE
oF THE URUGUAY ROUND 12, Pub. No. GAO/NSIAD-88-144BR (May 1988).
1'91 Filipek, supra note 42, at 126-27. The other 14 negotiating groups are: Tariffs,
Nontariff Measures, Natural Resources, Textiles, Tropical Products, GATT articles, Multi-
lateral Trade Negotiations Codes, Safeguards, Subsidies, Trade-Related Intellectual Prop-
erty, Trade-Related Investment Measures, Dispute Settlement, Functioning of the GATT
System, Services, Government Procurement and Steel. Judith H. Bello & Alan F. Holmer,
U.S. Trade Law and Policies Series No. 19: The Uruguay Round: Where Are We?, 25 Ir'L LAw.
727-30 (1991).
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recting and preventing restrictions and distortions including those
relating to structural surpluses so as to reduce the uncertainty, im-
balances and instability in world agricultural markets.
Negotiations shall aim to achieve greater liberalization of trade
in agriculture and bring all measures affecting import access and ex-
port competition under strengthened and more operationally effec-
tive GATT rules and disciplines. 192
An agriculture negotiating group was established in early 1987,
and six nations and nation groups submitted negotiating proposals
for agricultural trade liberalization. The four main players were the
United States, the EC, the Cairns Group' 93 and Japan.194 The initial
U.S. proposal called for the complete removal over a ten-year period
of all agricultural subsidies that directly or indirectly distort trade,
and the elimination of all import barriers. "President Reagan spoke
of his-commitment 'to achieve the goal of free agricultural trade by
the year 2000.' "195 This proposal was totally opposed by the EC
negotiators. In its counter-proposal, the EC clearly indicated that its
price and support system was not negotiable. It called, instead, for a
gradual reduction in agricultural subsidies and for short-term emer-
gency measures to reduce surpluses.' 9 6
The Cairns Group submitted a proposal generally viewed as a
compromise between the U.S. and EC positions. Under the Cairns
Group proposal, "[a]ll measures not explicitly provided for in
GATT, including variable levies, ... would be prohibited. All tariffs
on agricultural products ... would be set at low levels or zero.'' 97
Government support measures, except structural adjustment and di-
rect income support, would be prohibited. 98 Finally, the Japanese
proposal was more along the lines of the EC plan. It "recommended
reducing export subsidies and improving rules on market access
while noting the need for taking into account the special characteris-
tics [of agriculture] within each country" and the importance of
food-security.199
B. The Second Phase
The second phase of the Uruguay Round began in January
1988. While various GAIT participants put forward additional and
192 Ministerial Declaration of Punta Del Este, of 20 September, 1986, reprinted in K.R. Sim-
monds, The Community and the Uruguay Round, 25 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 95, 112 (1988).
193 The Cairns Group is a heterogeneous block of net agricultural exporters that in-
cludes both developed and developing countries that consider themselves "fair traders in
agriculture." Member states are Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Colombia,
Hungary, Indonesia, Malaysia, New Zealand, the Philippines, Thailand, and Uruguay.
194 Proposals were also submitted by the Nordic Countries (Finland, Iceland, Norway,
and Sweden) and Canada.
195 GAO, supra note 190, at 17.
196 GAO, supra note 190, at 25-26.
197 GAO, supra note 190, at 26-27.
198 GAO, supra note 190, at 26-27.
199 GAO, supra note 190, at 28.
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more realistic proposals, no agreement on agriculture could be
reached during the so-called "mid-term" review meeting in Montreal
in December 1988. Although agriculture was only one of fifteen dif-
ferent topics to be discussed, the Cairns Group of agricultural ex-
porters, backed by the United States, made the liberalization of
agricultural trade a precondition for the successful completion of the
Round as a whole. 200 Whereas the contracting parties reached
framework agreements in eleven of the fifteen negotiating groups,
they were not able to agree on the subject area of agriculture. 20 1 Af-
ter further negotiations, however, GAIT participants reached a
framework agreement on agriculture and the other remaining areas
during a meeting in Geneva in April 1989.202 This framework agree-
ment called for "substantial progressive reductions in agricultural
support and protection, sustained over an agreed period of time, re-
sulting in correcting preventing restrictions and distortions in world
agricultural markets. ' 203 Subsequently, new proposals were submit-
ted by the United States, the EC, the Cairns Group and Japan, but
there appeared to be very little progress in moving towards a
compromise. 20 4
After political commitments were made at the highest levels20 5
to reach some form of agreement on agricultural trade, new propos-
als were formulated and submitted in preparation for the final talks
which were scheduled in December 1990. The proposals concen-
trated on three areas: internal support, market access and export
subsidies. The United States called, in October 1990, for a 75% re-
duction in the most trade-distorting internal support measures and a
30% cut in less trade-distorting measures over ten years. Market ac-
cess would be granted by converting nontariff import barriers to tar-
iffs (tariffication), whereafter existing tariffs would be bound. Both
the new and existing tariffs would be reduced by an average of 75%
over ten years. Finally, export subsidies on primary agricultural prod-
ucts would be reduced by 90% over ten years, and export subsidies
on non-primary processed agricultural products would be phased
out in six years. 20 6
In November 1990, the EC counter-proposal did not come close
200 Mahler, supra note 189, at 39.
201 There was also no agreement on import safeguards, intellectual property, services,
and textiles.
202 U.S. GEN. AccT. OFF. [GAO], AGRICULTURAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS: STALEMATE IN
THE URUGUAY ROUND 8, Pub. No. GAO/NSIAD-91-129 (Feb. 1991).
203 Id.
204 Id. at 9.
205 The difficulties concerning liberalizing agricultural trade were addressed at the
ministerial meeting of the Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development (con-
sisting of 24 industrialized nations) in May 1990, and at the Economic Summit of the G-7
countries (Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the United Kingdom and the United
States) in July 1990. Id.
206 Id. at 10-11.
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to the United States' demands. The EC called for a commodity spe-
cific reduction of internal supports by 10% to 30% from 1986 to
1996.207 With respect to market access, the EC was willing to convert
its variable levies and other nontariff barriers to tariffs. However, the
tariffs would still consist of a fixed and a variable component. A cor-
rective factor would continue to take into account world market price
fluctuations. There was no specific commitment to reduce the newly
converted tariffs. The EC proposal also called for rebalancing,20 8
which would allow for the reduction of support and protection for
one commodity to be accompanied by an increase in the traditionally
low protection of other commodities. Finally, the proposal did not
contain a precise commitment on export subsidies. It was assumed that
the proposed reduction of internal support and import barriers
would automatically lead to a considerable lowering of export
subsidies209
The Uruguay Round was scheduled to conclude during the first
week of December 1990 in Brussels. However, participating coun-
tries failed to reach an agreement on agricultural reform. The EC
insisted that credit must be given for reforms taken since 1986, that
tariffication would be subject to rebalancing, and that commitments
on export subsidies would also have to apply to U.S. deficiency pay-
ments.2 10 The EC was supported by South Korea and Japan, 2 11 two
countries traditionally concerned with protecting domestic agricul-
tural production, especially rice. As a result, the entire round of ne-
gotiations was suspended, and the ultimate outcome remains
uncertain.
207 A 30% cut in internal support was offered for such commodities as cereals, rice,
sugar, oilseeds, livestock and dairy products, while a 10% cut was offered for fruits and
vegetables and tobacco. The EC insisted that credit should be given for reforms taken
since 1986. In 1986 internal EC support was at its peak, and subsequently lowered in the
following years. Effectively, the proposed reductions in internal support would thus only
be 15% and 5%, respectively, for the period 1991-96.
208 "During the Dillon Round (1961-62) the U.S. managed to secure a 'zero-dutybind-
ing' for oilseeds, oilseed meals, and some other feed substitutes from the EC. Although
not considered of major importance at that time, this concession has proven to be one of
the most significant ever achieved by the Umited States" J. ZIETZ & A. VALDtS, AGRICUL-
TURE IN THE GATT: AN ANALYSIS OF ALTERNATIVE APPROACHES TO REFORM 13 n.3 (1988).
A major goal of the EC in the Uruguay Round is to renegotiate these low tariff bindings,
under the rebalancing concept, a proposal fiercely rejected by the U.S. Filipek, supra note
42, at 140.
209 GAO, supra note 202, at 11.
210 Deficiency payments are direct income subsidies providing farmers with a per
bushel payment equal to the difference between a legislated target price, and the higher of
either the market price or the government nonrecourse loan rate. When the target price is
set above the world market price, deficiency payments encourage increased production,
expand total world supply, and depress worldmarket prices. KNUTrsoN ET AL., supra note 83,
at 244-46. In fact, this operates somewhat like a straight EC export subsidy which aims at
undercutting the world market price.
211 GAO, supra note 202, at 11-12.
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C. The Dunkel Proposal
By February 1991, the GATT's Trade Negotiations Committee
(TNC) agreed to restart the trade talks. The agriculture negotiations
resumed on March 1, 1991, but little progress has been made since
that time. The latest proposal was presented by Arthur Dunkel, Gen-
eral Director of the GAT, on December 20, 1991. Under the
Dunkel Proposal, domestic support programs delivered to agriculture
would be cut by 20% between 1993 and 1999. Countries would not
be obliged to reduce domestic support if those supports made up no
more than 5% of domestic prices. The value of export subsidies would
have to be reduced by 36% between 1993 and 1999. Volumes would
be reduced by 24%. Market access would be improved by a 36% cut
in border restrictions between 1993 and 1999. Finally, contracting
parties would have to reduce their use of sanitary and phytosanitary
(SPS) measures to restrict imports. 2 12
It took the EC only three days to decide that these proposals
were inadequate. The EC's main argument was, again, that the pro-
posals continue to call into question the foundation of the Commu-
nity's CAP.2 13 Also, the EC still insists on its rebalancing concept. 2 14
Dunkel refused to reopen his proposals for fresh negotiations. In-
stead, he has instructed the EC to settle differences over agricultural
trade with the other negotiators, principally the United States, and
bring back a compromise solution acceptable to all. 21 5
Although the EC refused to accept the Dunkel Proposal as a ba-
sis for further negotiations, the reform package of May 1992 does
come closer to the Dunkel plan than previous EC proposals. The
centerpiece of the reform plan is a 29% cut in grain subsidies that is
expected to meet the Dunkel demands of a 20% cut in domestic
grain support. On the other hand, the 20% reduction of internal
support set forth by the Dunkel Proposal would include many of the
direct payments the Community wants to grant to farmers under the
May 1992 reform plan. The EC does not regard those payments as a
distortion of trade and does not want the GATF to interfere with the
internal reform process.
The 36% cut in the value of the export grain subsidies de-
manded by Dunkel is also expected to be met. When the gap be-
tween the EC target price and the world market price gets smaller,
212 Sanitary and phytosanitary measures are border restrictions imposed by countries
to ban imports of certain commodities because of health related concerns, or fear of pests
and diseases. Sanitary and phytosanitary measures are often considered artificial trade bar-
tiers by the exporting country. For example, the EC bans import of U.S. beef treated with
hormones, allegedly because of health concerns. For a recent discussion of GATT and the
EC hormone ban, see Jackson, supra note 38, at 435-36.
213 Elliott, GATT Negotiators to Discuss Dunkel's Package, FEEDSTUFFS, Dec. 30, 1991, at 1.
214 David Dodwell, GATT Wobbles on the Brink: The Failure of the Deadlocked Uruguay Round
is Almost Unthinkable, but it is Looming Dangerously Near, FIN. POST, Apr. 3, 1992, at 39.
215 Id.
1993]
N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG.
export subsidies will fall. Moreover, with any recovery of the world
market prices, market forces will push EC prices down even further
and move CAP close to world prices by 1996. The main problem
area, however, is formed by the 24% cut in the volume of subsidized
exports of grain. The reform plan is expected to fail to substantially
curb excess grain production. The export of subsidized grain will
still be necessary to dispose of surplus production.2 16
V. Why there is no Agreement on Agriculture: A European
Perspective
When looking. at agriculture and the Uruguay Round from a Eu-
ropean perspective, several obstacles can be identified that preclude
a compromise agreement on agriculture. First, constraints are
caused by GATT as an organization and a treaty. Second, the CAP
forms an obstacle in that it is more important for the EC than agri-
cultural policy in general is for other countries. Third, the Uruguay
Round established a*clear negotiating scope in its 1986 Ministerial
Declaration that launched the Round, as well as in its subsequent
mid-term Review. Both documents set a limitation on what is negoti-
able. Finally, the United States attitude and negotiating stand forms
a considerable obstacle. It is not always obvious that the Community
can be held primarily liable for these constraints, as is often charged.
On the contrary, the United States may be held responsible, directly
or indirectly, for most obstacles.
A. Constraints Caused by the GATT
A first constraint in the Uruguay Round that prevents an agree-
ment on agriculture results from the structure of GATT as an organi-
zation. An ITO within the U.N. framework with broad powers and a
carefully worked out charter could have been a more effective body
in regulating and liberalizing trade in agricultural goods. However,
the United States prevented the ITO from coming into existence and
thus provided the basis for the current situation with a "temporary"
GATT, which not only lacks any enforcement powers, but also has to
function with virtually no constitution designed to regulate its activi-
ties and procedures.2 17 Furthermore, the GATT does not have an
adequate dispute settlement procedure, whereas the ITO provided
for the ICJ to fill this gap. The ICJ could have played a leading role
in the settlement of trade disputes. The GATT dispute settlement
procedure is ineffective in that it provides ample room for the con-
tracting parties to block progress at various stages of the
216 See The CAP and the GAT': America Must Let Europe's New Farm Deal Unlock the Uruguay
Round, supra note 145, at 20; EC Farm Policy: Getting Better, supra note 146, at 55-56.





In the field of agriculture, an adequate dispute settlement proce-
dure is all the more necessary because of the formulation of the
GATT as a treaty. Trade in agricultural products was basically ex-
cluded from the strict GATT regime for industrial and manufactured
products. The GATT provisions on agriculture were originally
designed, and subsequently interpreted, to fit existing U.S. domestic
agricultural support programs. The United States insisted on special
treatment for agriculture, whereas a number of other countries
strongly opposed this idea. Furthermore, by achieving the formal
GATT waiver in 1955, the United States emphasized and legitimized
the primacy of domestic farm programs over international trade
obligations. 2 19
This provided an. opportunity for the EC, which was created ten
years after the adoption of GAIT and three years after the acquired
waiver, to establish its CAP without violating existing OATT convic-
tions. Thus, the creation of the CAP in its current form, with the use
of variable import levies and export restitutions as the principal agri-
cultural trade measures, was only possible as a result of earlier ac-
tions by the United States. 220 Moreover, the establishment of the
CAP was originally welcomed by the United States for important polit-
ical reasons. The United States wished a stronger and more united
Europe, and the CAP was viewed as a bold and serious attempt to
meet this considerable challenge. 22' It was felt that if the CAP was
the price for European unity, and thus for strengthening the Euro-
pean pillar of the Atlantic Alliance, it was a fair price to pay. 22 2 Ac-
cordingly, the CAP was not seriously challenged during its initial
years. For example, during the Kennedy Round (1963-67) there was
very little talk about the CAP's trade distorting effects. Only when it
became clear in the late sixties that the growth in EC export subsi-
dies was detrimental to U.S. agricultural interests did the United
States' attitude change. 22 3
B. Constraints Caused by the CAP
It is often suggested that no agreement on agriculture has been
reached in the Uruguay round because the EC is simply unwilling to
change the CAP. Although the EC's unwillingness is quite obvious,
it cannot be the sole reason for a failure to reach an agreement, be-
cause the Community has, from the start, taken the position that the
218 See supra notes 36-37 and accompanying text.
219 See supra notes 44-57 and accompanying text.
220 HARRIS ET AL., supra note 103, at 275.
221 Strang, supra note 85, at 56.
222 These concerns were expressed by the State Department, the National Security
Council, as well as in the office of the U.S. Trade Representative. PETIT, supra note 170, at
57.
223 ZIETz & VALDfS, supra note 208, at 13.
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basic principles of the CAP are not negotiable. The trinity of CAP
principles-single market, Community preference, and financial soli-
darity224 -are still so important for the EC that they cannot be called
into question. During the Tokyo Round, the first GATT Round in
which the EC participated with a fully developed CAP, the Commu-
nity stated that the CAP's "principles and mechanisms [could] not be
called into question and therefore [would] not constitute a matter for
negotiation. ' 22 5 Subsequently, the United States took the position
that it did not envision weakening the CAP in any way.2 26
Since the CAP is the "central pillar in the Community's institu-
tional system" and "the political . . .cement which holds together
the different parts of the Community", 227 the EC is indeed unwilling
to change the three basic principles of the CAP. 22 8 However, since
such fundamental change was never intended by the Community, the
proposals submitted by the United States and the Cairns Group, in
particular the sections on export subsidies, are beyond a realistic
agreement. As export subsidies are an integral part of the CAP's
principles of Community preference and market unity, a ban or sig-
nificant reduction in export subsidies would be equivalent to funda-
mentally changing the nature of Europe's internal agricultural policy
regime. This would not be the case for any other country to the
same extent.22 9 In addition, comprehensive tariffication would mean
an end to the variable levies, a keystone of the CAP principle of
Community preference. 230 The Community is simply not ready to
undertake this commitment, and has been open and honest about it
during the negotiating process.
Likewise, the Council of Ministers of the EC has stated that the
Dunkel proposal does not conform to the fundamentals of the
CAP.2 3 ' It not only reduces the volume of subsidized exports sub-
stantially, but also interferes with the recently adopted plan for inter-
224 For a discussion of the basic CAP principles, see supra notes 94-99 and accompany-
ing text.
225 Quote from the EC's negotiating mandate during the Tokyo Round, cited in HARRIS
ET AL., supra note 103, at 278.
226 This was stated in 1979 in a letter by Robert Strauss, the U.S. Trade Representa-
tive written to F. Gundelach, vice-president of the EC Commission. The EC considered
subsequent pressures from the U.S. to change the CAP in 1982 as a breach of this gentle-
men's agreement. PETIT, supra note 170, at 58 and n. 76.
227 Commemorating 30 Years of the Common Agricultural Policy, Speech by Mr. Ray Mac-
Sharry, EC Commissioner for Agriculture, at a reception for the Dublin Horse Show, July
19, 1990, reprinted in EUR. COMMUNITY NEWS, No. 30/90, July 19, 1990, at 1.
228 "We are fully engaged in the Uruguay Round process. But let me make it clear, we
are doing so on the basis of our commitment to the CAP and to its basic principles and
mechanisms of market unity, community preference and financial solidarity .... There can
be no question of setting aside these achievements or to put [sic] them at risk." Id. at 3.
229 ZIETZ & VALDES, supra note 208, at 76.
230 ZIETZ & VALDES, supra note 208, at 76. See also supra notes 96-97 and accompanying
text.
231 Carlson, Farm Groups Say GATT Plan Falls Short, FEEDSTUFFs, Jan. 13, 1992, at 23.
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nal reform.232 Thus, the range of a possible agreement on
agriculture in the Round has been limited from the start. However,
an agreement has never been excluded by these limitations. In fact,
the reforms adopted by the EC in May 1992 show that it is possible to
substantially reform the CAP without changing its basic principles.
C. Constraints Caused by the Uruguay Round
The EC's unwillingness to negotiate its fundamentals is fully
consistent with the Punta del Este Ministerial Declaration. The dec-
laration, fully subscribed to by the United States calls only for greater
liberalization of trade in agriculture, and strengthened and more effec-
tive GATT rules and disciplines on agriculture. Nevertheless, in
Montreal in 1988, the United States demanded the total elimination of
all support to agriculture and, consequently, no agreement could be
reached. This demand was set aside in Geneva the following year
when the framework agreement on agriculture called for substantial
reductions in agricultural support and protection. The position taken
by the Community, that the basics of the CAP are beyond the scope
of the Uruguay Round, is not inconsistent with either the Punta del
Este, or the Geneva declarations, and provides a framework for the
scope of the negotiations. The reform plan adopted by the Commu-
nity suits these declarations by providing substantial reductions in
agricultural support prices, while at the same time keeping the basics
of the CAP intact.
D. Constraints Directly Caused by the United States
Apart from America's historical responsibility for the GATT in
its current form, and the American failure to adequately recognize
the EC's negotiation limits or the limited scope of the Uruguay
Round, the United States may have caused even more harm by its
method of negotiation. Its inflexible all-or-nothing approach pre-
vented any progress during the first four years of the GATT.2 33
Moreover, it convinced the EC that the U.S. proposal was not aimed
at the liberalization of world trade in agriculture, but rather at the
destruction of European agriculture. 23 4 In short, the extreme Amer-
ican approach to agricultural reform was a non-starter.2 35
232 For a discussion of the reform plan, see supra notes 142-147 and accompanying
text.
233 Arthur Dunkel (Chairman of the GATT) stated: "It is from the day we came down
to more realistic numbers that the negotiations started .... In fact it is not so far away that
we started the real negotiations in agriculture. Sorry to say it. The maximalist approach
was bringing nothing." Dunkel GA 7T Leader Optimistic About Completion of Trade Negotiations,
FEEDSTUFFS, Mar. 9, 1992, at 6.
234 Agriculture, supra note 88, at 63.
235 This view is clearly shared at least among some Americans. For example,
"[C]learly, the U.S. is losing on every front. The U.S. strategy is wrong. Bush must give up
his ag reform game plan that's been a failure from the beginning. Instead of winning sub-
19931
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The belief that Europe could be forced into agricultural reform,
however, is demonstrated by the U.S. implementation of its Export
Enhancement Program (EEP).236 The EEP enables the U.S. exporter
to export agricultural commodities at prices below U.S. domestic
prices. While the international effects of the CAP are largely unin-
tended consequences of a domestic policy,23 7 the United States ag-
gressively set up EEP to combat EC subsidies, despite serious
Australian and Canadian complaints. 238
As is the case with the EEP, the U.S. condemnation of EC export
subsidies often sounds a little deceptive. First, the Community can
point at the Marketing Promotion Program,239 the GSM-102 short
term240 and the GSM intermediate credit programs,241 and the Pub-
lic Law 480 program 242 as American trade-distorting export subsi-
dies. Second, the EC considers the U.S. system of deficiency
payments as a "direct" export subsidy at a low level in the produc-
tion chain. 243 The United States requests the EC to make a specific
commitment on export subsidies without admitting that deficiency
payments may have many of the same effects. Third, other examples
of indirect agricultural subsidies include federal water programs for
farmers2 44 and low grazing fees on the public lands for livestock pro-
ducers. In addition, the total amount spent on agriculture in Europe
is less than the total amount spent in the United States, 245 and per-
stantial concessions from the EC, it's won harsh, and deserved, criticism from U.S. allies in
world trade." Editorial in FEEDSTUFFS, Jan. 20, 1992, at 20.
236 For an explanation of the EEP, see supra note 124.
237 Buckwell, supra note 162, at 238.
238 House, Despite Complaints, Bush Says EEP Won't End Until Europe Cuts Subsidies, FEED-
STUFFS, Jan. 20, 1992 at 6. See also Administration Urges more EEP Funds to Pressure EC in
Multilateral Talks, 8 INT'L TRADE REP. (BNA) 300-301 (1991).
239 The Marketing Promotion Program (MPP) is a U.S. export promotion program
designed to encourage development, maintenance, and expansion of commercial farm ex-
port markets. Under the program, eligible participants receive generic commodity certifi-
cates in payment for promotional activities approved by the Secretary of Agriculture.
LIProN, supra note 18, at 27.
240 GSM-102 is the largest U.S. agricultural export promotion program. It guarantees
repayment of private, short-term credit for up to 3 years. LIProN, supra note 18, at 27.
241 GSM-103 is an export promotion program complementing GSM-102. It guaran-
tees repayment of private credit for 3-10 years. LIProN, supra note 18, at 24.
242 Public Law 480 (P.L. 480) is an agricultural export program which seeks to expand
foreign markets for U.S. agricultural products, combat hunger, and encourage economic
development in developing countries. Title I (Food for Peace Program), makes U.S. agri-
cultural commodities available through long-term dollar credit sales at low interest rates
for up to 30 years. Title II provides for donations for emergency food relief and nonemer-
gency assistance. Finally, Title III (Food for Development Program) provides government-
to-government grant food assistance to least developed countries. LIPTON, supra note 18,
at 35.
243 For an explanation of deficiency payments as export subsidies, see supra note 209.
244 Scheid, EC Highlights U.S. Farm Trade Barriers, Subsidies, FEEDSTUFFS, Apr. 29, 1991,
at 4.
245 On May 2, 1991, the EC Commission agreed to a total 1992 Community budget of
$81.3 billion. Support to agriculture is expected to take $43.3 billion in 1992, up 6.6%
from the 1991 allocation. Expenditures by the individual member states are expected to be
in excess of $12 billion. Spending on EC Agricultural Support Continues To Escalate, in U.S.
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haps more significantly, the amount of government support received
per farm is at least double in the United States than it is in the EC. 24 6
Finally, the Community will point out that despite all American accu-
sations, the EC has remained a substantial net importer of agricul-
tural products, whereas the United States itself is a net exporter.
Moreover, the EC is the leading foreign market for American agricul-
tural exports, and consistently registers a deficit in its agricultural
trade with the United States.2 47
VI. The Future of Agriculture in the GATT
Before addressing the question of what can and needs to be
done with regard to the present situation in the GATT Uruguay
Round, a number of current and future developments concerning
agriculture need to be taken into account. These developments offer
substantial hope for the future of agricultural trade liberalization.
A. Developments in Europe
The Single Market of "Europe 1992" is planned to come into
effect on January 1, 1993, and will complete the elimination of all
internal borders within the Community. Obviously, the threat of a
fully integrated "Fortress Europe" worries American agricultural ex-
porters. However, the most important effect of "Europe 1992" on
agriculture will be the lower political profile accorded to agriculture
on the EC agenda, as broader economic and political goals dominate
the effort to create a more united Europe.2 48 The CAP, a unifying
force historically, may lose part of its importance in the years to
come. Furthermore, EC agricultural production is intended to drop,
consumption is expected to increase, and U.S. agricultural producers
may well benefit from a borderless EC with fewer import restric-
DEP'T OF AGRIC., supra note 130, at 46. In the United States, the Bush administration pro-
posed a $59.4 billion budget for 1993 fiscal spending by the U.S. Department of Agricul-
ture. Spending would fall four percent from the previous year. David Wessel, Proposal
Indicates Bush is Willing to Bend on the Issue of the Deficit, WALL ST. J., Jan. 30, 1992, at A6. Note
that it is extremely hard to adequately compare these two budget figures. The figures,
most importantly, show that the EC as well as the United States spend enormous sums on
the support of their respective agricultural sectors.
246 Interview with the EC agricultural attache in Washington, Jacques Vonthron. What
Iron Curtain? EC Attache Challenges Protectionist Charge, FEEDSTUFFS, Feb. 17, 1992, at 3. More-
over, the EC charged that in 1987, for instance, the U.S. spent $11,250 per farmer in farm
aid, almost five times what the CAP cost per farmer. OFFICE FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATIONS OF
THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, supra note 80, at 43. It should also be noted that considering
the much larger average farm size in the U.S., the support per acre or hectare will be consid-
erably lower in the U.S. Again, these figures may only show that both the U.S. and the EC
support their agricultural sector to a considerable extent.
247 Mahler, supra note 189, at 41.
248 Summary and Post-Conference Update, in EC 1992: IMPLICATIONS FOR WORLD FOOD AND
AGRICULTURAL TRADE, supra note 110, at 288.
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tions. 24 9 Although in some instances agricultural export into the
Community market will be restricted, the overall net effect for U.S.
agriculture should be positive.250
The astonishing developments in Eastern Europe may, in the
short run, provide additional export markets for Community pro-
duce, but in the long run will put more pressure on the EC for re-
forms. The performance of the agricultural sectors in Eastern
Europe and the former Soviet Union will be strengthened when their
economic systems improve and become more efficient. Agricultural
production will probably outclass EC production because of more
favorable conditions for agriculture in Eastern Europe.251 The big-
gest help the EC could provide the emerging democracies would be
to open its market for Eastern European products. It will be politi-
cally very difficult for the Community to refuse entry to cheaper im-
ports from Eastern Europe. Relaxation of the CAP's import regime
and a further decrease of EC agricultural production is a possible
outcome.
Likewise, agricultural trade liberalization may be accelerated by
the creation of the European Economic Area (EEA). In October
1991, the EC agreed to form a free trade zone for the movement of
goods, services, capital and workers with the seven current European
Free Trade Association (EFTA) members. 252 The EEA will create,
beginning on January 1, 1993, the world's largest trading bloc with
380 million consumers accounting for over forty percent of world
trade. The seven EFTA countries will, for the present, maintain their
own domestic agricultural policies rather than implement the Com-
munity's CAP. Nevertheless, the EEA agreement does obligate par-
ticipating countries to harmonize national legislation, including
regulation in the field of agriculture. Consequently, it may obligate
countries like Norway and Switzerland with a very high level of agri-
cultural subsidies to lower those levels. Furthermore, both the
EFTA and EC countries will work towards further liberalizing agri-
cultural trade within the Area. 253 Agricultural trade negotiations on
a global scale may benefit in the long run.
249 Summary and Post-Conference Update, in EC 1992: IMPLICATIONS FOR WORLD FOOD AND
AGRICULTURAL TRADE, supra note 110, at 288.
250 Summary and Post-Conference Update, in EC 1992: IMPLICATIONS FOR WORLD FOOD AND
AGRICULTURAL TRADE, supra note 110, at 288.
251 For example, Eastern Europe as a region may become a net exporter of 5-6 million
tons of non-subsidized grains by the end of this decade. Summary and Post-Conference Update,
in EC 1992: IMPLICATIONS FOR WORLD FOOD AND AGRICULTURAL TRADE, supra note 110, at
287.
252 The current EFTA states are Austria, Finland, Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway,
Sweden and Switzerland. The EFTA was created in 1960 by European states that were
then unwilling or unable to join the EC. The initial member states were Austria, Denmark,
Norway, Portugal, Sweden, Switzerland and the United Kingdom. Some states subse-
quently left EFTA to join the EC, and new states joined EFTA.
253 EC-EFTA Agree to Form EEA, AGRI-FOOD TRADE UPDATE, Dec. 9, 1991, at 6.
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Finally, the most important incentive for the EC to further re-
form the CAP is its price tag. The financial burden of the high guar-
anteed prices in combination with the purchase, storage and disposal
of over-production cannot be borne much longer. The adopted re-
form plan does not lower EC spending on agriculture. On the con-
trary, EC farm spending is expected to increase by fourteen percent
over the next five years as a result of the direct income support to
farmers. 254 The EC is fully aware of the need for other and more
significant changes. However, the delicate reform process takes time
and patience, and too much pressure and interference from the trad-
ing partners may prove to be counter-productive. 255
B. What Needs to Be Done?
In light of these historical, present and future developments, a
number of options are worth mentioning. First, to reach any form of
agreement in the future, it is essential that the United States change
its attitude and negotiating position. The United States must accept
some responsibility for the stiff GATT procedures, the agricultural
loopholes in the Agreement, and the relatively limited scope of the
Uruguay Round. At the same time, it must recognize the EC's nego-
tiating limits, which are neither unfair nor unreasonable nor unex-
pected, considering the historical context. Consequently, the United
States must lower its expectations of how far the EC can go in re-
forming its CAP. It must recognize that it is currently politically im-
possible for the Community to go beyond the May 1992 reform
proposals. 25 6 If the United States and the EC can agree on the non-
trade distorting character of the direct support payments adopted by
the Community to compensate EC farmers for the loss in agricultural
income as a result of substantial price cuts, the possibilities of a com-
promise on agriculture will multiply. Finally, the United States must
negotiate, not demand. As British Agricultural Minister John Gum-
mer has said: "The U.S. must realize that it is not an imperial power
that can dictate an agreement." 25 7
A serious danger attached to this change in the U.S. stance, how-
ever, may be formed by a possible rejection by the United States
Congress of an agreement in the Round. Taking into account the
recognized limits and lowered expectations of the Round, the con-
254 Farm Ministers Approve Overhaul of EC's Common Agricultural Policy, supra note 144, at
915.
255 For example, in the past U.S. pressure seems to have helped overcome deep inter-
nal differences over agriculture in the Community. Britain, normally a U.S. ally on agricul-
ture, recently displayed a surprising unity towards its EC partners, in order not to bow for
American pressure.
256 Farm Ministers Approve Overhaul of EC's Common Agricultural Policy, supra note 144, at
914.
257 USDA Preparing $1 Billion Increase in Export Subsidies if GATT Talks Fail, supra note 3,
at 573.
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tent of an agreement will undoubtedly be distant from initial U.S.
proposals and will possibly be considered less favorable for Ameri-
can agriculture than no agreement at all. In addition, the so-called
fast-track procedure, under which Congress has to vote on a Uru-
guay Round agreement before mid-1993, will put additional pres-
sure on GATT negotiators and the United States Congress. 258 The
discussion and acceptance of a compromise on agriculture in the
Uruguay Round are further complicated by recent election year poli-
tics, making efficient negotiating more complex.
At the same time, the present-day political scene in Europe may
be even more troublesome. In June 1992, the Danish voters unex-
pectedly rejected the Community's plans for further economic, mon-
etary, and political integration embodied in the Maastricht Treaty of
December 1991.259 Although neither required by the Maastricht
Treaty nor by domestic legislation, the French had their referendum
in September 199 while Europe held its breath. French voters ac-
cepted the Treaty by a minimum margin. It is unclear what the sta-
tus of the Treaty and the European integration process is now that
the Community is confronted with Denmark's rejection and France's
apparent hesitation. The French farmers, angered by the recent
CAP reforms, overwhelmingly rejected deeper European unity
through the referendum. The French government cannot be ex-
pected to anger its farmers even more by striking a GATT agreement
that would lead to more and unpopular CAP reforms.2 60
Additional pressure is put on the European integration process
by the sudden collapse of the exchange-rate mechanism (ERM) of
the European Monetary System (EMS). 261 The British pound ster-
258 Under the so-called "fast-track" authority for the President, the U.S. Congress will
not be able to formulate any amendments to the GATT agreement, but is limited to a
straight up or down vote concerning. the agreement and its implementing legislation.
Without fast-track, a GATT agreement would be subject to endless amendments by Con-
gress unaccaptable for the other parties to the agreement. Fast track authority will expire
on June 1, 1993. Under the current trade act, fast-track cannot be renewed again, as it was
last year. Only a completely new trade act can give the President new fast-track authority.
The Uruguay Round: Death by Procrastination, ECONOMIST, July 18-24, 1992, at 68-69.
259 Maastricht is the Dutch city where, during a European summit meeting in Decem-
ber 1991, the EC member states agreed to form an Economic and Monetary Union (EMU)
including a European central bank and the European Currency Unit (ECU) as its single
European currency by no later than January 1, 1999. A great number of other provisions
were to ensure a closer political union. The Treaty will not come into force before it has
been ratified by all twelve member states. The parliaments of Luxemburg and Greece al-
ready adopted the Treaty. The Danish and Irish constitutions require a referendum. Ire-
land adopted the Treaty, but the Danish voters rejected. France also organized a
referendum. The Parliaments of the other member states still need to ratify. It is yet un-
clear what is going to happen to the European union now that Denmark rejected the plans.
260 See Half-Maastricht, ECONOMIST, Sept. 26-Oct. 2, 1992, at 15; Stuart Auerbach, Den-
mark's Vote on EC Called A Threat to Free-Trade Talks. Officials: Referendum Hurts GA TT Efforts,
WASH. POST, June 9, 1992 at Cl, C8.
261 The EMS was introduced by the Community in 1979 to stabilize exchange rates
between EC member countries and is based on the ECU, a basket of specific amounts of
member states' currencies. The ERM preserves the monetary stability within the EMS. It
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ling and the Italian lira quit the system. The route to monetary
union intended in the Maastricht Treaty was through a step-by-step
evolution of the ERM. The Britons argue that the Treaty's core, the
plan for economic and monetary union, cannot proceed now that the
ERM is breaking apart. The monetary union seems farther away
than ever. The Community will have to solve these problems before
it can move on to anything else. Therefore, it is hard to imagine any
progress on agricultural trade issues from the side of the EC during
this period of turmoil and uncertainty.
Thus, the scenario pictured above consists of a number of highly
uncertain elements and does not seem to form the right political
background for a GATT agreement on agriculture. Another route,
although certainly not without obstacles of its own, may be more suc-
cessful. Agriculture could simply be withdrawn from the present ne-
gotiations. Looking back, the biggest miscalculation in the Round
may have been the linkage between agriculture and the other negoti-
ating groups. Making the agreements in fourteen important fields in
the GATT Uruguay Round subject to an agreement on the complex
issue of agriculture on American terms has contributed to the cur-
rent deadlock, and threatens the very existence of the GATF as a
trade organization. Withdrawing agriculture from the Round will
not hurt the Community's reform plans. The EC is going to inter-
nally reform its agricultural policy independent of the outcome of
the Round, simply because it must change to meet modern needs.
The reforms will be carried out in the years 1993-1996 even without
comparable U.S. concessions, and more reforms will follow beyond
1996.262
On the other hand, for the majority of Uruguay Round partici-
pating countries, agricultural trade constitutes their prime inter-
est.2 63 By making agricultural trade liberalization a conditio sine qua
non, they attempted to force the United States and the EC into an
agreement on agriculture. This attempt, however, has been unsuc-
cessful. In a recent interview, GATT Director General Arthur
obliges participating member states to maintain their currency exchange rates within spec-
ified bands of their central rates against the ECU. These central rates are fixed. Most mem-
ber states are required to maintain their currency rates within a 2.25% band of their
central rates. Spain and the UK are permitted a 6% band, Greece and Portugal do not
participate. The central banks of the ERS participating countries are required to take cor-
rective action to maintain currency rates within these bands. Josling & Gardiner, supra note
110, at 9-11.
262 The U.S., on the other hand, has begun to implement legislation requiring the
Department of Agriculture to increase subsidies on U.S. agriculture exports by $1 billion
beginning October 1, 1993 and ending September 30, 1995 if no agreement in the Uru-
guay Round is reached by the end ofJune, 1992. USDA Preparing $ 1 Billion Increase in Export
Subsidies if GATT Talks Fail, supra note 3, at 572.
263 According to Carla Hills, U.S. Trade Representative, 60 of the 108 countries par-
ticipating in the Uruguay Round do so only because of their interest in agriculture. USTR
Hills Says Passage of Quota Bill Could Bring Collapse of Uruguay Round, 7 hrr'L TRADE REP.
(BNA) 1358, 1359 (1990).
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Dunkel refused to withdraw agriculture from the current GATT ne-
gotiations. In his view, a "piecemeal" approach would undermine
the possibilities to strike a package deal between the contracting par-
ties in which every country will have to give and take. 26 4
Another hurdle that needs to be overcome is the conception that
withdrawing agriculture from the Uruguay Round is a defeat for the
U.S. government, considering the emphasis the United States has
placed on agricultural policy reform. The recent presidential elec-
tion may solve this problem. In any event, it will be hardly tenable
that agreement in fourteen important negotiating groups, though
not on agricultural trade, can be considered a defeat, while no agree-
ment at all can be hailed as a victory.
Withdrawing the agricultural negotiating group from the Uru-
guay Round may be the only viable possibility left for the Uruguay
Round to survive. Technical complexities, political sensitivities; na-
tional peculiarities, and economic and social consequences of agri-
cultural policy reform in the United States, the EC, and Japan will
prevent further modifications of domestic farm policies in the short
run. These are political realities we will have to live with. This does
not mean, however, that all efforts to liberalize global agricultural
trade will have to be put aside. On the contrary, efforts to reach an
agreement on this crucial issue need to be doubled. But time, pa-
tience and mutual understanding are required in this delicate and
slow moving process.
Concluding Remarks
The United States has become increasingly unhappy with the
EC's CAP. The CAP causes serious trade distortions on the interna-
tional market, severely limits access to American products and cre-
ates unfair competition on the world market by heavily subsidizing
the export of surpluses. Nevertheless, while seeking reform in the
Uruguay Round, the United States must not disregard the historical
and political realities within the GATT and Europe which it helped
to create. At the same time, the United States must give the EC
credit for its unprecedented reforms of the CAP, which offer hope
for the future.
Europe will ultimately have to, and is going to, further reform its
CAP, but this process will take decades. More than anything else, the
EC needs time. The political structure of the Community and the
importance of agriculture in Europe prevent any significant short-
term reforms beyond the ones already adopted and suggested. Se-
vere pressure by the United States has been counterproductive.
Under the assumption that the Community's recent reform plan will




be considered insufficient by the American negotiators and politi-
cians, the only way to break the current stalemate in the GATT Uru-
guay Round, and thus to save the Round, may be the withdrawal of
agriculture from the negotiations, a choice that will be very hard to
accept for the developing countries and agricultural exporters.
Some would say that the Uruguay Round will still have failed if an
agreement is reached without agriculture. However, after forty-five
years of GATT, the Uruguay Round has now made domestic agricul-
tural policy finally subject to multilateral negotiation. Apart from re-
sults in any other field, this may form the most prominent result of
the Round for future generations.
Epilogue
After the manuscript of this article had been finished, a number
of important developments took place that need to be addressed.
The United States and the EC finally solved their agricultural dispute
with the Washington Agreement of November 1992. Although not a
GAT agreement in itself, this bilateral accord not only unlocked the
stalled Uruguay Round, but also solved the oilseeds dispute, another
thorny agricultural dispute between the United States and the EC.
The agreement prevented a transatlantic trade war from becoming
reality.
A. The Oilseeds Dispute
In 1962, the United States managed to secure a "zero-duty-
binding" for oilseeds from the EC during the GATT Dillon Round.
Accordingly, U.S. exporters may enter the EC duty-free. Since then,
European oilseeds farmers have been awarded direct subsidies by
the Community. A GATT panel has twice found that the subsidies
undermine the United States' right to duty-free access in the EC and
limit U.S. export possibilities. The Community basically ignored the
GATT reports. The oilseeds conflict has been pulled into the agri-
cultural trade talks of the Uruguay Round, even though it is not a
Round topic in itself. After long and painful negotiations a shaky
compromise was reached. In 1993, subsidized oilseeds production
in Europe will be cut by idling fifteen percent of the Community's
acreage normally under oilseeds. In the years thereafter, Commu-
nity producers will have to at least idle ten percent of their oilseeds
acreage. The Agreement also mentions binding arbitration as the
method to settle future disputes in this area.2 6 5
265 The oilseeds acreage of the Community was set at 5,128 hectares (around 11,795
acres). Akkoord Tussen EC on VS in Twoo Geschillen Doorbraak [Accord Between EC and U.S. is
Break-through in Two Disputes], FINANCIEELE DAGELAD, Nov. 21/23, 1992, at 3.
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B. Uruguay Round
The other part of the Washington Agreement dealt with the
main stumbling block of the Uruguay Round: the farm subsidies. It
was based on the earlier Dunkel proposal, accepted by the United
States, but rejected by the Community.266 The EC's internal reform
plan (the MacSharry Plan)2 67 already met the Dunkel demands of a
20% cut in'domestic subsidies and a 36% reduction of the value of
subsidized exports. The remaining problem area was the limitation
of the volume of subsidized exports. Whereas the Dunkel Proposal
called for a 24% cut in the volume of subsidized exports, the United
States 'and EC finally agreed on a 21% cut over a period of six years.
The deal will start in 1994 and takes the 1986-88 export situation as
the reference period. This reduction from 24% to 21% seems to be
a compromise. It may be considered a victory for the EC because it
does not even come close to the original U.S. demands, which in-
cluded elimination of all farm subsidies by the year 2000. On the
other hand, the EC initially did not want to make any commitments
at all on export subsidies. The 21% cut is also expected to go be-
yond the reforms of the MacSharry Plan.2 68 Thus, it may be consid-
ered a U.S. victory since the EC swore it would not go beyond
MacSharry.
Furthermore, the direct payments afforded by the MacSharry re-
forms to the EC farmers to compensate them for a loss of income as
a result of price cuts were accepted by the United States. The direct
compensation payments, which form the centerpiece of the CAP re-
forms, are no longer an issue between the United States and the EC.
The Community considers acceptance, of these payments as interna-
tional recognition of their new CAP. They are not included in the
internal subsidies that need to be cut by 20%, but then neither are
the American deficiency payments. 269 Finally, the concept of
rebalancing2 70 is not part of the Washington Agreement. This is a
clear U.S. victory since rebalancing has been an important EC de-
mand throughout the Round.
With the compromise on the agricultural subsidies, the United
States and the EC can finally go back to the other GATT participat-
ing countries in Geneva to try to work out a general Uruguay Round
agreement. Because a number of serious hurdles remain, such an
agreement is not expected before the first months of 1993.
266 See supra notes 212-16 and accompanying text.
267 See supra notes 136-147.
268 The Uruguay Round: Coup de Grace, Coup de Foudre, ECONOMIST, Nov. 28, 1992, at 70,
79.
269 Accord Between EC and U.S. is Break-through in Two Disputes, supra note 265. For a
description of deficiency payments, see supra note 210 and accompanying text.
270 See supra notes 208 and 214 and accompanying text.
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C. Still No Agreement on Agriculture in the GATT Uruguay Round
In order to secure a general GATT agreement with all partici-
pating countries, three main hurdles still need to be overcome. First,
despite their EC membership, the French have threatened to "veto"
any deal that would hurt their vital national interests. Without
proper compensation in other areas, the French consider the Wash-
ington Agreement in its current form unacceptable. French farmers,
who are already in trouble, will be hit hard by the oilseeds compro-
mise and the volume reduction in the subsidized agricultural
exports.
From a strictly legal perspective, however, France does not have
a veto. Under Community law, the European Commission negoti-
ates a trade agreement, and the Council of Ministers (representing
the member states) decides with a qualified majority whether to ac-
cept the agreement. 271 "Qualified majority" means fifty-four votes
out of the total seventy-six weighted votes.272 Accordingly, France
would have to rope in enough allies in the Council to gather the
votes it needs to block a final GATT deal negotiated by the Commis-
sion. France has no veto power by itself.
The French, however, would rather refer to the Luxembourg
Compromise which was agreed to by the original six Community
member states in 1966. One of the provisions of this Compromise
states that "the French delegation considers that where very impor-
tant interests are at stake the discussion must be continued until
unanimous agreement is reached. The six delegations note that
there is a divergence of views on what should be done in the event of
a failure to reach complete agreement." 273 This Compromise, which
has never been ratified and cannot be considered to have any legal
force at all,2 74 is often referred to as "an agreement to disagree."
Nevertheless, the French claim the right to eventually veto a final
GATT agreement if there will be no consensus in the Council be-
cause of their own opposition. So far, France has not used this con-
troversial option to reject the Washington Agreement. However, it
still has the option to invoke the Compromise in the near future
when the Council votes on a general GAT Uruguay Round agree-
ment between all one hundred eight GATT parties. By determining
that the agricultural part of the general agreement would hurt its
vital national interests, France can block this final deal. It is unclear
what would happen if that situation occurred.
Second, now that the United States and the EC have settled their
271 EEC TREATY art. 113.
272 In the Community system of weighted voting, Germany, France, Italy and the U.K.
have 10 votes, Spain has 8, Portugal, Greece, the Netherlands and Belgium have 5, Den-
mark and Ireland have 3, and Luxembourg has 2 votes. EEC TREATY art. 148.
273 HARTLEY, supra note 59, at 14.
274 Id.
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farms disputes, the other GATT parties need to go along. Japan, for
example, will have to open its heavily protected rice market. Rice is
sacred in Japan. The Dunkel Proposal contained a provision to con-
vert import restrictions on rice into tariffs. Japan, supported by
South Korea, views the bilateral United States-EC Agreement as a
revision of the Dunkel Proposal. Accordingly, Japan claims to also
have a possibility to amend the Dunkel draft by excluding the Japa-
nese ban on rice imports from the tariffication provisions. It is highly
unlikely that the other GATT parties (especially the United States)
will accept a rice exception. 275 On the other hand, the big agricul-
tural producers united in the Cairns group may think the Washing-
ton Agreement does not go far enough. They seem to have no
choice but to accept a United States-EC dictate on farm subsidies.
Finally, just as a general GATT Agreement must be approved by
the EC Council of Ministers before it is ultimately accepted, the
Agreement must also pass through the United States Congress. Cur-
rent fast-track legislation prevents Congress from amending a trade
agreement. 276 Fast-track authority expires onJune 1, 1993. If a gen-
eral GATT agreement is not initiated by March 1, 1993, new legisla-
tion extending the fast-track is required. If adopted at all, new
legislation is likely to carry far more conditions on the terms of nego-
tiation than the current law does. It seems unlikely that the final
GATT deal will be initiated in time to avoid new legislation and fur-
ther complications.
D. Conclusion
At the moment of writing, there is still no agreement on agricul-
ture in the GAT Uruguay Round. Now that the first cheers about
the Washington Agreement have faded, agriculture remains a time-
bomb under a general GATT Uruguay Round Agreement.
The option suggested at the end of this article-withdrawing ag-
riculture from the Round-has never received much attention and
now seems further away than ever. Nevertheless, it would have been
a better option than the current situation, and perhaps it still is.
Most importantly, despite the Washington Agreement, there is still
no agreement on agriculture, causing further delay in a time of
worldwide economic recession. The United States-EC dispute has
been replaced by a United States-France dispute and an internal EC
dispute. There is still no guarantee that we will conclude the final,
comprehensive and much needed GATT Uruguay Round Agree-
ment in 1993.
275 See Japan: Rice Pudding, ECONOMIST, Nov. 28, 1992 at 37.
276 See supra note 258 and accompanying text.
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